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Abstract
Absent an agreed international legal framework, attempts by the United States or any other
nation or private entity to acquire and bring to Earth significant quantities of He-3 could give rise
to controversy and conflict. Consequently, it seems timely to revisit the issue of the legal regime
potentially applicable to exploiting He-3 and other lunar resources. Part I of this Article will
briefly discuss the technical and economic prospects for the develop of He-3-based fusion energy.
Part II lays out the present legal situation concerning the exploitation of lunar resources such as
He-3. Part III analyzes whether it is prudent for the United States to seek an international lunar
resource regime. Concluding that it would be, Part IV provides possible policy options for the
United States concerning the establishment of an international legal regime capable of facilitating
the development of He-3-based fusion energy.
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A LEGAL REGIME FOR THE MINING OF
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During the past several years, the United States and three of
the world's other leading space powers, Russia, China, and India,
have each announced their intent to establish a base on the
Moon, in part with the purpose-or, in the case of the United
States, at least the exploratory goal-of seeking to mine and
bring to Earth helium-3 ("He-3"), an isotope' of helium rarely
found naturally on Earth but believed to be present in large
amounts as a component of the lunar soil.2 The potential value of
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This Article draws upon and develops material in an earlier study by Richard B.
Bilder, Eugene N. Cameron, Gerald L. Kulcinski, and Harrison H. Schmitt, LEGAL
REGIMES FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 FROM THE MOON (1989), available at
http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar8901-1.pdf, prepared under the auspices of the
Wisconsin Center for Space Automation and Robotics ("WCSAR") for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"). I also draw considerably for my
discussion of technical aspects of lunar helium-3 ("He-3") mining and the potential for
He-3 fusion energy from HARRISON H. SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON: EXPLORATION,
ENTERPRISE, AND ENERGY IN THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT OF SPACE (2006).
I wish to express my appreciation for helpful comments to Professor Gerald L.
Kulcinski, Grainger Professor of Nuclear Engineering and Director of the Fusion
Technology Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison; Professor John F.
Santarius, Associate Director of the Fusion Technology Institute at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison; former Senator Dr. Harrison H. Schmitt, who conducted geological
studies on the Moon as a member of the crew of the 1972 Apollo 17 lunar landing
mission; and Professor Bernard Oxman of the University of Miami Law School.
However, their generous assistance should not be regarded as necessarily indicating
their agreement with my legal analysis or policy suggestions.
1. An isotope is a chemical element form that holds a different number of neutrons
in its nucleus than the other isotopes of the element and therefore carries a different
atomic mass but retains its atomic number. See, e.g., The Artemis Project, Lunar Helium-
3 as an Energy Source, in a Nutshell, http://www.asi.org/adb/02/09/he3-intro.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
2. The commitment of former President George W. Bush's administration to a U.S.
return to the Moon by 2020 is described below. However, as this Article goes to print,
the U.S. plan to return to the Moon has been cast into doubt by President Barack
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Obama. On February 1, 2010, he submitted the administration's proposed 2011 budget
for the NASA, which would put an end to NASA's Moon-bound Constellation program
and effectively eliminate funds for any future U.S. manned lunar missions. See Joel
Achenbach, Sun Sets on NASA Moon Mission as 2011 Budget Scales Back Goals, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 2010, at A8; Kenneth Chang, Billions for NASA, With a Push to Find New Ways Into
Space, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A16. President Obama's proposed cancellation of
NASA's Moon program has given rise to criticism. See, e.g., Christopher Caldwell, One
Step Back for Mankind, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 6, 2010, at 7; Kenneth Chang,
Under Fire Administrator Defends NASA 's New Direction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, at A17;
Amy Klamper, Angst Greets Obama Space Plan, SPACE NEWS, Jan. 29, 2010,
http://www.spacenews.com/policy/100129-angst-greets-obama-space-plan.html;
Harrison H. Schmitt, Obama Space Policy Cedes Moon to China, Space Station to Russia and
Liberty to the Ages, FREE REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/2445788/posts. As of this writing, it is uncertain whether Congress will agree to
President Obama's change in direction. See Achenbach, supra.
On January 14, 2004, President George W. Bush committed the United States to a
long-term human and robotic program to explore the solar system, starting with a return
to the Moon by 2020. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush
Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program: Fact Sheet (Jan. 14, 2004),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/
20040114-1.html; John King & Miles O'Brien, Bush Unveils Vision for Moon and Beyond,
CNN, Jan. 15, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/space/01/14/bush.space/;
David E. Sanger & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Backs Goal of Flight to Moon to Establish
Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at A27.
In December 2006, NASA announced more detailed plans for a United States
return to the Moon by 2020 and the establishment of a permanent lunar base by as early
as 2024. See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, NASA Plans Lunar Outpost; Permanent Base at Moon's
South Pole Envisioned by 2024, WASH. POST., Dec. 5, 2006, at Al; Warren E. Leary, NASA
Plans Permanent Base for Exploration on the Moon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2006, at A20. In May,
2007, NASA released THE GLOBAL EXPLORATION STRATEGY: THE FRAMEWORK FOR
COORDINATION (2007), available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
178109main-gesjframework.pdf [hereinafter NASA, GLOBAL EXPLORATION STRATEGY],
a document developed by fourteen national space agencies, including NASA, presenting
a vision and plan for international collaboration in space exploration, including
exploration of the Moon. The Global Exploration Strategy notes that: "Finally, the Moon's
known abundance of Helium-3 could prove valuable if fusion reactors ever become
feasible in the future," id. at 11, and NASA includes the study of lunar helium-3 for
"fusion reactors on Earth" to "reduce Earth's reliance on fossil fuels" among its list of
goals for future lunar missions. See NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
[NASA], LUNAR EXPLORATION OBJECTIVES 4 (2006), available at www.nasa.gov/pdf/
163560main LunarExplorationObjectives.pdf. According to Mark Williams, "While the
U.S. Space Agency has neither announced nor denied any desire to mine helium-3, it
has nevertheless placed advocates of mining helium-3 in influential positions." Mark
Williams, Mining the Moon: Lab Experiments Suggest that Future Fusion Reactors Could Use
Helium-3 Gathered from the Moon, MIT TECH. REv., Aug. 23, 2007, at 1.
On June 18, 2009, NASA launched its Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter to conduct
investigations for supporting future human exploration to the Moon. See Press Release,
NASA, NASA Returning to the Moon with First Lunar Launch in a Decade (Dec. 18,
2009), available at http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2009/jun/HQ.09-142_LRO.
LaunchSuccess.html; Jeffrey Kluger, U.S. Shoots for the Moon, This Time to Stay, TIME,
June 18, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1905344,00.html. See
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generally NASA, Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Website: Mission Overview,
http://lunar.gsfc.nasa.gov/mission.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (describing the
technical aspects of the orbiter and the mission).
For the possible impact of budgetary limitations on NASA's proposed lunar
programs, possibly presaging President Obama's subsequent change in policy, see the
recent October 22, 2009 report by the blue-ribbon Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight
Committee, appointed by President Obama, and chaired by Norman Augustine, REVIEW
OF U.S. HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT COMMITTEE, SEEKING A HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PROGRAM
WORTH OF A GREAT NATION (2009) (suggesting that NASA should bypass the Moon for
now). For comment on the report see, for example, Kenneth Chang, Behind Moon Travel
Goal, Big Talk and Little Money, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at D2; Dennis Overbye, NASA
Panel Grapples with Cost of Space Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A20; Robert S. Boyd,
Money Woes Likely to Hobble NASA's Planned Moon Mission, MCCLATCHYDC.COM, Sept. 3,
2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/washington/story/74870.html.
On Russia, see Russia to Launch Industrial Mining of Helium-3 on Moon in 2020,
PRAVDA, Mar. 17, 2006, at 1, available at http://english.pravda.ru/science/tech/
77404-moon-0. In fact, a statement by Nikolai Sevastianov, head of the S.P. Korolev
Rocket and Space Corporation "Energia," in January 2006, disclosed that mining
helium-3 on the Moon is a main goal of the Russian space exploration program: "We are
planning to set up a permanent station on the Moon by 2015. The industrial mining of
helium-3, a rare isotope, is expected to begin on the Moon in 2020." Id.; see also AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Russia Plans Mine on the Moon by 2020, SPACE DAILY, Jan. 25, 2006,
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/RussiaPlansMineOnTheMoon-By-2020.html.
On China, see, for example, Jia Hepeng, He Asked for the Moon-and Got It, CHINA
DAILY, Nov. 2, 2009, at 1 (quoting cosmochemist and geochemist Ouyang Ziyuan of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, now in charge of the Chinese Lunar Exploration
program, as noting on many occasions that one of the many goals of the program would
be the mining of helium-3 from which "each year three space shuttle missions could
bring enough fuel for all human beings across the world"); see also Aiming High: China Is
Moving Heaven and Earth to Put a Man on the Moon, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 2009, at 13;
Melinda Liu & Mary Carmichael, To Reach for the Moon: China's Lunar Program is About
More than National Pride; Try This: A Limitless Supply of Clean, Safe Energy, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
12, 2007, at 38; Casey Kazan, China's New Moon Mission Blasts Off-Is Mining Helium 3 the
Ultimate Goal?, DAILYGALAXY.COM, Oct. 25, 2007, http://www.dailygalaxy.com/
my-weblog/2007/10/chinas-new-moon.html; China Tools up for Asian Space Race,
SPACEDAILY.COM, July 12, 2009, http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China-tools.up_
forAsian.space-race_999.html.
On India, see Somini Segupta, India Launches Unmanned Orbiter to Moon, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2008, at A8; Atul Sethi, Helium-3 Sparks Interest in Moon, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 23,
2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/HealthSci/Helium-3_sparks-interestin_
moon/articleshow/3631756.cms; Posting of Naxal Watch to INTELLIBRIEFS,
http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com (Oct. 22, 2008, 2:32 AM EST).
Japan is also planning a manned mission to the Moon by 2020 and an operational
lunar base by 2030. See, Michio Kaku, The New Race for the Moon, WALL ST. J., June 23,
2009, at A13. For a broader discussion on recent activities of member states of the
United Nations ("U.N.") Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ("COPUOS")
relating to the Moon, see U.N. Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [COPUOS],
Legal Sub-Comm., Note by the Secretariat: Activities Being Carried Out or to Be Carried Out on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, International and National Rules Governing those Activities
and Information Received from States Parties to the Agreement Governing the Activities of States
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He-3 is that it is theoretically an ideal fuel for thermonuclear
fusion power reactors, which could serve as a virtually limitless
source of safe and non-polluting energy.3 For example, it is
estimated that forty tons of liquefied He-3 brought from the
Moon to the Earth-about the amount that would comfortably fit
in the cargo bays of two current U.S. space shuttles-would
provide sufficient fuel for He-3 fusion reactors to meet the full
electrical needs of the United States, or one quarter of the entire
world's electrical needs, for an entire year.4
While the technological and economic feasibility of fusion-
based nuclear energy, particularly fusion reactors utilizing He-3
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies about the Benefits of Adherence to that Agreement, 4-
18, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.271/Add.1 (Oct. 22, 2008).
For further reading, see generally Adrian Blomfield, Russians Suspect a Plot as NASA
Backs Out ofJoint Moon Exploration, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 1, 2007, at 18 (reporting that
many countries, including China, Germany, India, Russia, and the United States, are
taking the possibility of mining lunar He-3 "very seriously"); Jeffrey Kluger, 40 Years
Later, It's Moon Race 2.0, TIME, Nov. 24, 2008; John Lasker, Race to the Moon for Nuclear
Fuel, WIRED, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2006/12/
72276; Williams, supra.
3. See L.J. Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3 for Commercial Fusion Power, 10
FUSION TECH. 167 (1986) [hereinafter Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3]; see also
BILDER ET AL., LEGAL REGIMES FOR THE MINING OF HELIUM-3 FROM THE MOON (1989) ;
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON: EXPLORATION, ENTERPRISE, AND ENERGY
IN THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT OF SPACE 13-33, 71-75 (2006) [hereinafter SCHMITT,
RETURN TO THE MOON]; see also Harrison H. Schmitt, Mining the Moon, POPULAR
MECHANICS, Oct. 2004, at 56; Timothy Ferris, Op-Ed, A New Pathway to the Stars, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at 49; Lawrence E. Joseph, Op-Ed, Who Will Mine the Moon?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995, at A19 (in which he asks, "Will the Moon become the Persian Gulf
of the 21st Century?"); Gary Cramer, There's Helium-3 in Them There Moon Hills!, Dec. 14,
2004, http://www.direct.ca/trinity/helium3.htm; Moon Gas May Solve Earth's Energy
Crisis, Nov. 26, 2004, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200411/
s1252715.htm;Julie Wakefield, Researcher's and Space Enthusiasts See Helium-3 as the Perfect
Fuel Source, SPACE.COM, June 30, 2000, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/
helium3_000630.html; Williams, supra note 2.
In MOON (Sony Pictures 2009), a recently released science fiction movie, the
protagonist is an astronaut sent to the Moon on contract with a private Japanese
company to mine helium-3 to be used in terrestrial fusion energy reactors, which, at that
time, supply seventy percent of the world's energy. See id.
4. Estimate given to author by Professor Gerald Kulcinski, Director of the Fusion
Technology Institute, University of Wisconsin-Madison; cf SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE
MOON, supra note 3, at 5 ("One metric tonne (2200 lbs.) of helium-3 fused with
deuterium ... has enough energy to supply a city of ten million, or one-sixth of the
population of the United Kingdom, with a year's worth of electricity, or over ten
gigawatts of power for that year."). For earlier estimates, see G.L. KULCINSKI & H.H.
SCHMITT, THE MOON: AN ABUNDANT SOURCE OF CLEAN AND SAFE FUSION FUEL FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 29 (1987); BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 32; The Artemis Project, supra
note 1.
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as fuel, is still uncertain and contested, and its commercial
realization at best decades away,5 the implications of such a
development could be far-reaching and profound. Fusion energy
could significantly reduce the world's heavy dependence on fossil
fuels, which are associated with environmental pollution,
greenhouse gas emissions, and global warming-not to mention
their rising price and role in recurrent geopolitical and
economic tensions. Fusion energy could also provide a safer
alternative to many countries' growing reliance on energy
generated from nuclear fission reactors, which hold the potential
dangers of nuclear accidents, terrorism, weapons proliferation,
and radioactive waste disposal. Moreover, in contrast to the
prospect of depletion of terrestrial fossil fuels, it is estimated that
there is sufficient He-3 present on the Moon to meet humanity's
rapidly growing energy needs for many centuries to come.6 Thus,
despite the problematic future of He-3-based fusion energy, it is
not surprising that the United States and other major powers are
beginning to position themselves to ensure their future access to
lunar He-3 resources.
However, the growing interest in lunar He-3 poses its own
problems. As yet, there is no international consensus on whether,
or how, any nation or private entity can exploit or acquire title to
lunar resources. The U.N.-developed 1967 Outer Space Treaty7
does not specifically address this question. The related U.N.-
sponsored 1979 Moon Agreement 8  purports to lay the
groundwork for the eventual establishment of a regime for the
exploitation of lunar resources, but that agreement has thus far
been ratified by only a very few countries-not including the
United States and none of which are currently leading space
5. See, e.g., MSNBC Cosmic Log, http://cosmiclog.msnbc.msn.com (Apr. 2, 2008,
7:25 EST); see also Marvin L. Adams, Sustainable Energy from Nuclear Fission Power, BRIDGE,
Winter 2002, at 20-27 (2002).
6. See Adams, supra note 5, at 24.
7. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
8. Agreement on the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement]. While the agreement is
referred to by the U.N., and will be referred to in this Article, as "the "Moon
Agreement," it is more commonly referred to in relevant literature as the "Moon
Treaty." See, e.g., references cited infra note 10.
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powers. 9 Absent an agreed international legal framework,
attempts by the United States or any other nation or private
entity to acquire and bring to Earth significant quantities of He-3
could give rise to controversy and conflict. Indeed, without the
security of an established legal regime, nations or private entities
might well be reluctant to commit the very substantial money,
effort, and resources necessary to mine, process, and transport
back to Earth the amounts of lunar He-3 sufficient to support the
broad-scale terrestrial use of He-3-based fusion energy.
Consequently, it seems timely to revisit the issue of the legal
regime potentially applicable to exploiting He-3 and other lunar
resources.10 Part I of this Article will briefly discuss the technical
9. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, U.N. TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES
ON OUTER SPACE AND RELATED GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS: STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE AS OF 1 JANUARY
2009, U.N. Doc. ST/SPACE/l/Rev.2/Add.2, U.N Sales No. E08.I.10 (2009)
[hereinafter STATUS OF OUTER SPACE AGREEMENTS].
10. The Moon Agreement, and the question of the legal regime applicable to the
exploitation of lunar resources, has spawned a surprisingly extensive literature,
particularly in the early 1980's following the Moon Agreement's completion by
COPUOS and its submission for consideration by the United States and other nations.
See, e.g., SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 275-98; BILDER ET AL., supra
note 3, at 36-70, 76-109; see also The Moon Treaty: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Science,
Technology, and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce and Transportation, 96th Cong. (1980)
[hereinafter 1980 Senate Hearings]; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
SPACE OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., REPORT OF
EILENE GALLOWAY (Comm. Print 1980) (providing an analytical study of the
background, history, and issues raised by the Moon Agreement); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
96TH CONG., REPORT OF OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (Comm. Print 1980)
(presenting a study of technologies and possibilities for the exploitation of
extraterrestrial resources and an analysis of issues, constraints, and possible
congressional actions regarding the Moon Agreement); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE AND TRANSPORTATION,
96TH CONG., REPORT OF CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Comm. Print 1980)
(reviewing the technological, foreign policy, and legal issues which may arise in
connection with examination of the Moon Agreement) [collectively hereinafter 1980
SENATE COMMITTEE STUDIES]. See generally KERNAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE
COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159-204 (1998); CARL Q.
CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 246-341 (1982)
[hereinafter CHRISTOL, MODERN LAW OF OUTER SPACE]; M.J. PETERSON,
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR THE FINAL FRONTIER 153-72 (2005); VIRGILIU POP, WHO
OWNS THE MOON: EXTRATERRESTRIAL ASPECTS OF LAND AND MINERAL RESOURCES
OWNERSHIP (2008); GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 102-66 (1989) (collecting articles, with comments).
Among the many relevant articles, see, for example, A. Blaser, The Common Heritage
in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law and the Moon in the 1990s, 5 J. L. & TECH. 79 (1990); Bin
Cheng, The Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
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and economic prospects for the development of He-3-based
fusion energy. Part II lays out the present legal situation
concerning the exploitation of lunar resources such as He-3. Part
III analyzes whether it is prudent for the United States to seek an
international lunar resource regime. Concluding that it would
Celestial Bodies Within the Solar System Other than the Earth, December 18, 1979, 33 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 213 (1980); Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in
the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14
INT'L LAW. 429 (1980) [hereinafter Christol, Common Heritage]; Gennady M. Danilenko,
The Concept of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" in International Law, 13 ANNALS AIR &
SPACE L. 247 (1988); Michael E. Davis & Ricky J. Lee, Twenty Years After: The Moon
Agreement and Its Legal Controversies, 1999 AUSTL. INT'L L.J. 9 (1999); Stephen E. Doyle,
Legal and Policy Implications of Treating Natural Resources as the Common Heritage of
Mankind, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 31
(Amer. Inst. Aeronautics & Astronautics ed. 1986); Arthur M. Dula, Free Enterprise and the
Proposed Moon Treaty, 2 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3 (1979); E. Galloway, Issues in Implementing the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in
REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra, at 116-18; D. Goedhuis, Conflicts in the Interpretation of the
Leading Principles of the Moon Treaty of 5 December 1979, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 14, 14-29
(1981); D. Goedhuis, Some Recent Trends in the Interpretation and the Implementation of the
Rules of International Space Law, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213, 213-33 (1981); D.
Goedhuis, The Conflicts in the Interpretation of the Leading Principles of the Moon Treaty of
1979, 60 INT'L L. ASS'N CONF. REP. 479 (1982) [hereinafter Goedhuis, Conflicts]; Nathan
C. Goldman, The Moon Treaty: Reflections on the Proposed Moon Treaty, Space Law, and the
Future, in PEOPLE IN SPACE: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FOR A "STAR WARS" CENTURY 140
(James Everett Katz ed., 1985); Brian Hoffstadt, Moving the Heavens: Lunar Mining and
the "Common Heritage of Mankind" in the Moon Treaty, 42 UCLA L. REV. 575 (1994); N.
Jasentuliyana, The U.N. Space Treaties and the Common Heritage Principle, 2 SPACE POLICY
296 (1986); Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage
of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190 (1986); Fracis Lyall, On the Moon, 26J. SPACE L.
129 (1998); David Everett Marko, A Kinder, Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the
Current Moon Treaty and Proposed Alternative, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT'L L. 293
(1993); K. Narayana Rao, Common Heritage of Mankind and the Moon Treaty, 21 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 275 (1981); Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for
a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 363 (2004); Kevin B. Walsh,
Controversial Issues Under Article XI of the Moon Treaty, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 489
(1981); Sylvia Maureen Williams, International Law Before and After the Moon Agreement, 7
INT'LREL. 1168 (1981); Sylvia Maureen Williams, The Law of Outer Space and Natural
Resources, 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 142 (1987) [hereinafter Williams, Law of Outer Space];
Douglas Alan Barritt, Note, A Reasonable Approach to Resource Development in Outer Space,
12 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 615 (1990); Barbara Ellen Heim, Note, Exploring the
Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: Comparison of International Law Regimes for the Seabed,
Outer Space and Antarctica, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (1990); Harminderpal S. Rana,
Note, The "Common Heritage of Mankind" & the Final Frontier: A Revaluation of Values
Constituting the International Legal Regime for Outer Space Activities, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 225
(1994); A.D. Webber, Note, Extraterrestrial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime to Govern the
Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427 (1983); Kelly M. Zullo, Note, The
Need to Clarify the Status of Property Rights in International Space Law, 90 GEO. LJ. 2413
(2002).
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be, Part IV provides possible policy options for the United States
concerning the establishment of an international legal regime
capable of facilitating the development of He-3-based fusion
energy.
I. THE PROSPECTS FOR HE-3-BASED FUSION ENERGY1
He-3 is a component of the "solar wind" comprised of gas
and charged particles continuously emitted by the sun into the
solar system in the course of its thermonuclear fusion processes.1 2
During more than four billion years in which the solar wind has
impacted the Moon, significant amounts of He-3, in addition to
particles of other ionized components of the solar wind, have
become embedded in the Moon's regolith-the loose and dusty
upper layer of rocks and soil comprising much of the Moon's
surface.13 While He-3 constitutes only a minute proportion of the
lunar regolith, 14 it is estimated that, altogether, there may be as
much as one million metric tons of He-3 potentially recoverable
11. See L.J. Wittenberg et al., A Review of Helium-3 Resources and Acquisition for Use as
a Fusion Fuel, 21 FUSION TECH. 2230, 2230-53 (1992) [hereinafter Wittenberg et al.,
Review of Helium-3]; Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3, supra note 3; see, e.g.,
SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 63-143; BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at
13-35; G.L. Kulcinski & H.H. Schmitt, Fusion Power From Lunar Resources, 21 FUSION
TECH. 2221 (1992) ; J. Wakefield, Researchers and Space Enthusiasts See Helium-3 as the
Perfect Fuel Source, SPACE.COM, June 30, 2000, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/
helium3_000630.html; The Artemis Project, supra note 1.
For a description of the University of Wisconsin Fusion Technology Institute's
WCSAR research on the development of He-3 energy and a sampling of media coverage
regarding He-3, see FTI Research Projects: 3He Lunar Mining,
http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/proj?rm=he3. See generally, John Lasker, Future in Fusion? UW
Team Involved in Controversial 'Race' to Harness Moon's Energy, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wis.), Dec. 23-24, 2006, at Al.
12. See G.L. KULCINSKI ET AL., MINING HELIUM-3 FROM THE MOON-A SOLUTION TO
EARTH'S ENERGY NEEDS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (1990), available at
http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/fdm817.pdf. Normal helium, familiar as the gas used for
balloons and blimps, consists of two protons and two neutrons. He-3 is a light, stable
isotope of helium that contains two protons but only one neutron. The sun produces
helium by fusing together hydrogen atoms, releasing enormous amounts of energy, but
about one in every ten thousand helium atoms comes out in the form of He-3, missing
one neutron. For a brief popular description, see The Artemis Project, supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., KULCINSKI ET AL., supra note 12, at 8; The Artemis Project, supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., E. N. Slyuta, A. M. Abdrakhimov & E. M. Galimov, The Estimation of
Helium-3 Probable Reserves in Lunar Regolith, 38 LUNAR & PLANETARY SCI. 2175, 2176
(2007).
MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON
from the Moon's surface.' 5 This amount of He-3 is theoretically
equivalent to ten times the energy content of all of the coal, oil,
and natural gas economically recoverable on Earth. 16 Since the
Earth, unlike the Moon, possesses a magnetic field and
atmosphere that deflect the solar wind, He-3 is rarely found
naturally on Earth.1 7 The small amounts of He-3 available for
research and experiment on Earth are derived principally from
the decay of tritium used in thermonuclear weapons.'8
While interest in lunar He-3 relates to its potential use as a
fuel for thermonuclear power reactors,' 9 the technological and
economic feasibility of fusion power itself has yet to be
demonstrated. 20  Unlike the engineering and material
requirements for power production in the uranium and
plutonium-fueled nuclear fission reactors now operating in the
United States and a number of other countries, the generation of
power by thermonuclear fusion requires the containment of
ionized plasmas at extremely high temperatures, a feat not easily
or economically achievable at present with existing materials and
technology.21 Nevertheless, the enormous potential of fusion
15. See BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 26; Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3,
supra note 3, at 8.
16. See BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 32; Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3,
supra note 3, at 1.
17. See SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 79-80; Wittenberg et al.,
Lunar Source of He-3, supra note 3, at 7-9.
18. See BILDER ETAL., supra note 3, at 24-25; Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3,
supra note 3, at 2-7.
19. See BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 13-14; Wittenberg et al., Lunar Source of He-3,
supra note 3, at 1. For a more popular introduction to nuclear fusion, see Craig
Freudenrich, How Nuclear Fusion Reactors Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, Aug. 11, 2005,
http://science.howstuffworks.com/fusion-reactor.htm. The most likely use of He-3 as a
fuel would be together with deuterium ("D"), an isotope of hydrogen, in a
thermonuclear power reactor. See The Artemis Project, supra note 1.
20. See, e.g., T. KENNETH FOWLER, THE FUSION QUEST 200 (1997); W.J. Nuttall,
Fusion as an Energy Source: Challenge and Opportunities (Sept. 2008), available at
http://www.iop.org/activity/policy/publications/file-31695.pdf. For expressions of
skepticism concerning the practicality of nuclear fusion as a controlled source of energy,
see, for example, Nuclear Fusion: It's Impossible. And What's More, It's Improbable,
ECONOMIST, July 20, 2002, at 69, and Editorial, Nuclear Fusion Must Be Worth the Gamble,
NEW SCIENTIST,June 7, 2006, at 3.
21. See World Nuclear Ass'n, Nuclear Fusion Power (Sept. 2009), http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf66.html; Ursula Schneider, Fusion: Energy of the Future, INT'L
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Aug. 1, 2001, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2001/
08012001_news02.shtml; see also Conditions for Fusion, Princeton Plasma Physics Lab.,
http://www.pppl.gov/fusionconditions.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). For a brief
2010]
252 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:243
energy continues to spur persistent and intensive efforts to
overcome these obstacles. One of the most significant efforts is
the recent establishment, by a consortium of the European
Union (through the European Atomic Energy Community),
Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, the
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United
States, of the International Thermonuclear Experimental
Reactor ("ITER"),22 a large-scale, international experimental
research project designed to explore the scientific and
engineering feasibility of magnetic containment fusion power
production. 23 The program will be located in Cadarache, France,
and is expected to cost over US$12 billion and continue for thirty
years. 24
For a number of reasons, including the limited terrestrial
availability of He-3 and the very high temperatures required to
achieve He-3-based fusion, most current research, and any first
generation fusion power reactors, will likely be based on a fuel
cycle involving the fusion of deuterium ("D") and tritium ("T"),
discussion on the current state of technology of controlled thermonuclear fusion, see
J.F. SANTARIUS ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR D-3HE FUSION DEVELOPMENT 1 (2006), available at
http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/fdmI 1291.pdf.
22. ITER also translates from Latin as "the way." See ITER History,
http://www.iter.org/pro/pages/iterhistory.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
23. See generally Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion
Energy Organization for the Joint Implementation of the ITER Project, Nov. 21, 2006,
2006 O.J. L 358/62 [hereinafter ITER Agreement]. The International Thermonuclear
Experimental Reactor ("ITER") agreement was signed on November 21, 2006. SeeJohn
Tagliabue, France: Countries Agree to Pursue Fusion Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2006, at
A5; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, U.S. Signs International Fusion Energy
Agreement (Nov. 21, 2006). A signed copy of the original agreement is electronically
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/
infcirc702.pdf. The United States is authorized by Congress to participate in ITER under
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 972(c), 119 Stat. 594, 900-01 (2005)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16312 (2006)). For a description of the history and mission of
the ITER project, see the ITER website at http://www.iter.org/default.aspx (last visited
Feb.10, 2010).
24. See ITER Agreement, supra note 23, art. 24(1) (specifying the duration of the
project); Tagliabue, supra note 23 (designating Cadarache, France, as the site location).
Another different major experimental approach, attempting to utilize lasers to achieve
nuclear fusion and produce energy, is the National Ignition Facility ("NIF"), located at
Livermore, California. See, e.g., William J. Broad, In Hot Pursuit of Fusion (or Folly), N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2009, at DI; Daniel L. Lyons, Could this Lump Power the Planet,
Newsweek, Nov. 23, 2009, at 42; The National Ignition Facility: On Target, Finally,
ECONOMIST, May 30, 2009, at 81. For an expression of doubts regarding the likelihood
of success of the NIF, see, for example, Editorial, The Hoped-For Laser Miracles, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2007, at A24.
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two isotopes of hydrogen available on Earth and capable of
fusing at considerably lower temperatures.2 5 However, an He-3-D
fuel cycle, if and when technically achievable, theoretically offers
significant advantages as compared with the D-T fuel cycle.
Unlike a D-T fusion reaction, which results in considerable
neutron radiation, an He-3-D fusion reaction would produce
little radioactivity and a substantially higher proportion of
directly usable energy.26 More specifically, the comparative
25. See, e.g., SCHMITI, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 40-42, 64-65; BILDER
ET AL., supra note 3, at 13-14; SANTARIUS ET AL., supra note 21, at 1. See generally sources
cited supra note 12 (discussing the basics of nuclear fusion). Deuterium and tritium
("T") are both isotopes of hydrogen, an element whose most common isotope contains
no neutrons and only one proton in its nucleus. See Fusion Reactions, Princeton Plasma
Physics Lab., http://www.pppl.gov/fusionreactions.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). In a
D-T fuel cycle, the nucleus of deuterium, a stable isotope of hydrogen containing one
proton and one neutron, and the nucleus of tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen
containing one proton and two neutrons, come together in a fusion reaction that creates
a helium ("He4") nucleus consisting of two protons and two neutrons and releases one
high-energy neutron. The technical description of the reaction is D + T - n (14.07
MeV) + He4 (3.52 MeV), with the total energy released being 17.6 mega-electron volts
("MeV"). See, e.g., SCHMIrrr, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 64-65; see also World
Nuclear Ass'n, supra note 21.
26. See, e.g., SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 43-47, 65-67; G.L.
KULCINSKI, USING LUNAR HELIUM-3 TO GENERATE NUCLEAR POWER WITHOUT THE
PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WASTE (2001), available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/
presentations/glkjisdc.pdf; J.F. Santarius, D-3He Fusion: Physics, Engineering, and
Applications (2003), http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/presentations/ fs-hallway.pdf
[hereinafter Santarius, Overview Poster of D-He Fusion]; The Artemis Project, supra
note 1.
In an He-3-D fuel cycle, the nucleus of helium-3, consisting of two protons and one
neutron, captures the extra neutron of deuterium in a fusion reaction that creates a
normal helium nucleus and emits a proton. Since the product weighs less than the initial
components, the missing mass is converted to energy. The technical description of the
reaction is D + He-3 -. p (14.68 MeV) + He-4 (3.67 MeV), with the total energy released
being 18.35 MeV. See, e.g., SCHMiT-r, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 65-66; see
also The Artemis Project, supra note 1. One kilogram of He-3 burned in a fusion reactor
with 0.67 kilograms of deuterium will theoretically produce about 19 megawatt-years of
energy output. See The Artemis Project, supra note 1.
In an He-3-He-3 fuel cycle, two helium-3 nuclei, each consisting of two protons and
one neutron, fuse together to produce one helium-4 nucleus, consisting of two protons
and two neutrons, and release two high-energy protons. The technical description of the
reaction is He-3 + He-3 - 2p + He-4 (12.86 MeV), with the total energy released being
12.86 MeV. See, e.g., SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 66; KULCINSKI,
supra, at 5; J.F. SANTARIUS, LUNAR HE-3, FUSION PROPULSION, AND SPACE DEVELOPMENT
3 (1988), available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/fdm764.pdf. While this type of "third
generation" fuel cycle would theoretically produce no neutrons and thus no
radioactivity whatsoever, it would require such high temperatures as to be presently
impractical. See, e.g., SCHMr, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 45; G.L.
KULCINSKI & H.H. SCHMITr, NUCLEAR POWER WITHOUT RADIOACTIVE WASTE-THE
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advantages of an He-3-D fuel cycle over a D-T fuel cycle would
include: (1) increased electrical conversion efficiency; (2)
reduced radiation damage to containment vessels, obviating the
need for frequent expensive replacement; (3) reduced
radioactive waste, with consequent reduced costs of protection
and disposal; (4) increased levels of safety in the event of
accident; and (5) potentially lower costs of electricity
production. 27 In particular, an He-3-D fuel cycle would
significantly reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation because an
He-3-D reaction, unlike a D-T reaction, would produce few
neutrons and could not be readily employed to produce
plutonium or other weapons-grade fissile materials. 28
Consequently, interest in developing He-3-fueled thermonuclear
energy is likely to continue.
How would lunar He-3 be extracted and transported to
Earth?29 Because the solar wind components are weakly bound to
the lunar regolith, 0 it should be relatively easy to extract them
utilizing reasonable extensions of existing technology. In one
proposed scenario, once a lunar base is established, robotic lunar
mining vehicles fitted with solar heat collectors would: (1)
traverse appropriate areas of the Moon's surface-probably, in
particular, the lunar maria, or "seas"-scooping up the loose
upper layer of the lunar regolith and sizing it into small particles;
(2) utilize solar energy to process and heat the collected regolith
to the temperatures necessary to release, separate, and collect in
a gaseous state the He-3, along with certain other solar-wind
elements embedded in the regolith particles; (3) discharge the
spent regolith back to the lunar surface; and (4) return with the
collected He-3 and other gaseous byproducts to the lunar base. 3'
PROMISE OF LUNAR HELIUM-3 2-4 (2000), available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/
fdmll31.pdf.
27. KULCINSKI ET AL., supra note 12, at 4-7; see also BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at
17-22; SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 43-47; Santarius, Overview
Poster of D-3He Fusion, supra note 26.
28. See J.F. Santarius et al., A Passively Proliferation-Proof Fusion Power Plant, 44
FUSION SCI. & TECH. 289 (2003).
29. For a discussion of possible extraction methods, see SCHMITr, RETURN TO THE
MOON, supra note 3, at 111-24, and BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 26-30.
30. See KULCINSKI ET AL., supra note 12, at 8.
31. See id. at 8-10. For an alternative technique using an in-situ method to evolve
volatiles from the lunar regolith, see L.J. WITTENBERG, IN-SITU EXTRACTION OF LUNAR
SOIL VOLATILES (1993), available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar9311-3.pdf.
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The collected He-3 gas could then be liquified in the lunar cold
and transported to Earth, perhaps in remotely-operated
shuttles.3 2 Importantly, this type of mining operation could result
in the collection not only of He-3 but also significant amounts of
hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and water, all
potentially very useful-indeed, perhaps indispensable-for the
maintenance of a lunar base or further outer space activities such
as expeditions to Mars or other planets. 33 Since He-3 is believed
to comprise only a small proportion of the lunar regolith, it will
probably be necessary to process large amounts of lunar regolith
in order to obtain the quantities of He-3 necessary to sustain a
large-scale terrestrial He-3-based power program. However, the
extraction of He-3 and other solar wind components from the
lunar soil seems in itself unlikely to have a significant detrimental
impact on the lunar environment because the regolith will be
discharged back to the Moon's surface immediately after
processing. 34
Whether the production of lunar He-3-based fusion power
will prove commercially viable remains a complex and disputed
question. The commercial success of such a development will
clearly depend, among other things, on the parallel and
integrated achievement of both economically efficient He-3-
fueled fusion power reactors and a sustainable lunar mining
enterprise capable of economically extracting and returning to
Earth an assured supply of He-3 to fuel such reactors; neither is
worth pursuing without the other. However, the development of
He-3-based fusion need not start from scratch, but instead will
likely build on the substantial research and investment already
committed to the development of fusion power more generally in
ITER and other already ongoing projects. Moreover, the
development of lunar He-3 mining can similarly build on-and
indeed form an additional rationale for-the already existing
32. See SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 128.
33. See R.J. Bula et al., Potential of Derived Lunar Volatiles for Life Support, in 2 THE
SECOND CONFERENCE ON LUNAR BASES AND SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 547-
50 (W.W. Mendell ed., 1988); see also, BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 30-31; SCHMTrr,
RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 5, 109-43.
34. See generally E.N. Cameron et al., Net Environmental Aspects of Helium-3
Mining, Phase I: Effect on the Moon (Dec. 1990), available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/
pdf/wcsar9Ol2-1.pdf: G.L. Kulcinski, Environmental Aspects of Lunar Helium-3 Mining
(Jan. 1992), available at http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar9201-5.pdf.
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commitment of various space powers to establish lunar bases. As
indicated earlier, lunar mining activities may be worth
developing not only to extract He-3 from the regolith, but also to
obtain a variety of other byproducts highly useful for the support
of lunar bases.35
Finally, the economic viability of He-3-based fusion power
will, of course, depend on its eventual production cost relative to
alternative sources of energy such as fossil fuel or other
conventional sources of energy, energy produced by nuclear
fission reactors, or other forms of fusion energy-all figures
difficult to accurately predict at this time. Proponents of He-3-
based fusion energy argue that, notwithstanding the substantial
costs involved in developing He-3 fusion reactors, establishing a
lunar mining operation, and transporting He-3 back to Earth,
He-3-based fusion power will eventually be more than
competitive with the cost of other types of energy resources and
provide more than sufficient incentive for the participation of
both government and private enterprise.36  But other
35. See sources cited supra note 33.
36. See, in particular, the detailed discussion of He-3 fusion economics in SCHMITr,
RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3 and G.L. KULCINSKI ET AL., COMMERCIAL
POTENTIAL OF D-HE3 FUSION REACTORS (1987), available at
http://fti.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/fdm745.pdf. Schmitt predicts that He-3 gas could be
returned to Earth for under US$1 billion per metric ton. SCHMITr, RETURN TO THE
MOON, supra note 3, at 109-36. Kulcinski adds that, if He-3 was sold for US$4 billion per
metric ton, He-3 energy would still be comparable to the value of oil at US$28 per
barrel. See Margie Wylie, Moon Has No Fast Answer to Energy Needs, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
Feb. 1, 2004, at A20 (quoting Kulcinski). Between May 2008 and May 2009, the price of
crude oil ranged from about US$147 to US$30 per barrel. See Petroleum Navigator: Spot
Prices, U.S. Dep't of Energy, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/
Leafliandler.ashx?n=PET&s=rwtc&f=d. As of early October 2009 it was approximately
US$70 per barrel. See id. For a series of reports on the problematic future of oil as a
world energy source, see generally FOR. POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2009.
Apart from its potential use as a fuel for fusion reactors, He-3 has important uses
for, inter alia, scientific and medical research (for example, magnetic resonance
imaging), neutron detection (for example, in connection with U.S. Department of
Homeland Security responsibilities) and cryogenics. For recent indications of the impact
of He-3 shortages on such programs, see, for example, Helium-3 Shortage Could Put Freeze
on Low-Termperature Research, 326 SCI. 778 (2009); Matthew W. Wald, Ingredient Shortage
Slows a Program to Detect Smuggled Nuclear Bombs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A14.
According to the University of Wisconsin Fusion Technology Institute, the limited
amount of He-3 now available is priced at more than US$5000 per gram, which is
equivalent to US$5 million per kilogram or US$5 billion per metric tonne. See HARRISON
H. SCHMITT, BUSINESS APPROACH TO LUNAR BASE ACTIVATION 3-4 (2002); Graeme
Greene, A Wrong Step for Mankind?, METRO (London), May 27, 2009, at 14. Of course,
this price could be expected to decrease if supplies of lunar He-3 became available.
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commentators are more skeptical, doubting both the technical
feasibility of such a complex and challenging development and
the likelihood of He-3-based fusion power ever competing
successfully with more traditional Earth-based energy systems.37
Suffice it to say, major space powers currently consider the
potential of He-3-based fusion energy sufficiently promising as to
warrant their serious interest and to furnish at least an additional
rationale for their commitment to programs to establish national
stations on the Moon.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION
The most salient place to look for international rules
governing the mining of He-3 or other lunar resources is the
growing body of "space law," in particular, the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty and 1979 Moon Agreement. However, while each of these
sets out general principles relevant to the exploitation of lunar
mining, neither provides a detailed legal regime for the conduct
of such activities.
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty,38 which is legally binding on
100 nations, including all of the principal space powers,3 9
establishes a broad framework for the exploration and use of
outer space and is widely regarded as the "charter" of
international space law.40 As relevant to possible lunar mining
37. See, e.g., Lunar Science and Resources: Future Options: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Space and Aeronautics of the H. Science and Technology Comm., 108th Cong. 78-79 (2004)
(testimony of Dr. Timothy D. Swindle, Professor of Geosciences and Planetary Sciences,
University of Arizona); Frank Close, Fear over Factoids, PHYSICS WORLD, Aug. 2007, at 16-
17; Charles Seife, Moon's "Abundant Resources" Largely an Unknown Quantity, 303 SCI.
1603, 1603 (2004); see alsoJohn; J. Lasker, Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel, WIRED, Dec.
15, 2006, http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2006/12/72276?currentPage=all
(reporting that Jim Benson, founder of the space contractor Space Development, said
that mining the moon for helium-3 doesn't pass the "net energy test" because it would
require more energy to retrieve helium-3 and bring it back to Earth than it would yield).
But see Wittenberg et al., Review of Helium-3, supra note 11, at 37 (arguing otherwise on
the net energy test question).
38. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7.
39. See U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Treaty Signatures,
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do . The Outer Space
Treaty had also been signed by twenty-six additional states. Id.
40. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of Space
Debris, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 635, 653-54 (2003) (stating that the Outer Space Treaty "has
received universal acceptance among both commentators and spacefaring nations");
Amanda Lee Moore, Legal Responses for Lunar Bases and Space Activities in the 21st Century,
in LUNAR BASES AND SPACE ACTIVITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY (W.W. Mendel ed., 1985)
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activities, the treaty provides that the state parties may "use" the
Moon for peaceful purposes, presumably including not only
scientific but other activities as well, but that they have a general
obligation to share the benefits of their uses with all countries. 41
The treaty expressly prohibits any national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, use or occupation, or by any other means
over specific territory on the Moon,42 and forbids depriving "free
access" to any area of the Moon or discriminatively excluding any
state from the opportunity to explore or use the Moon.43
However, it recognizes that state parties may establish stations
and other installations on the Moon, 44 and that states have the
right to exercise jurisdiction over its installations and personnel. 45
In addition, these activities may be carried out by
nongovernmental entities, 46 international organizations, or joint
enterprises.47 Notably, while the Outer Space Treaty ostensibly
bars the assertion of exclusive territorial claim to particular lunar
mining sites, the treaty appears permissive in allowing a party to
make "use" of lunar resources,48 subject to certain general
environmental, notification, inspection, and other constraints. 49
Moreover, nothing in the treaty precludes the possibility of lunar
mining activities by state parties, intergovernmental
organizations, or private enterprises, or ownership over resources
removed from the Moon by such entities. 50 The treaty does
provide, however, that any "use" of lunar resources should, in
some unspecified sense and to some unclear extent, inure to the
benefit and in the interests of all countries. 51 More broadly, the
treaty also requires that all lunar activities shall be carried out
under the principle of cooperation and with due regard to the
interests of all other states parties. 52
(describing the Outer Space Treaty as the "Magna Carta" for the exploration and use of
space and the Moon); see also STATUS OF OUTER SPACE AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at vi.
41. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I.
42. Id. art. II.
43. Id. art. I.
44. Id. art. XII.
45. Id. art. VIII.
46. Id. art. VI.
47. Id. art. XIII.
48. Id. art. I.
49. See, e.g., SCHMITr, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 282-86.
50. See id.
51. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I.
52. Id. art. IX.
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As its name indicates, the 1979 Moon Agreement,53 which
was developed within the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space ("COPUOS") 54 and entered into force in 1984,
was intended to supplement the Outer Space Treaty by dealing
more specifically with potential human activities on the Moon
and other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than
Earth.55 Currently, it has been ratified by only thirteen
countries-Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan,
Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, and Uruguay-none of which are presently engaged
in significant space activities. 56 However, while the Moon
Agreement presently has few parties and is, in any case, not
legally binding on either the United States or any other current
or likely major "space power," it is nevertheless likely to form at
least the background for any possible future discussions
concerning the development of a lunar mining regime.
Consequently, it is worth describing in some detail.
Many provisions of the Moon Agreement in substance echo
already binding provisions of the Outer Space Treaty.57 However,
the most relevant and controversial provision of the agreement,
as it relates to the question of lunar mining, is article 11, which
purports to establish a framework for eventually establishing an
international regime to govern the exploitation of the Moon's
natural resources. Article 11 provides:
53. Moon Agreement, supra note 8.
54. COPUOS originally consisted of eighteen nation members, but has now grown
to sixty-nine nation members. See United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/COPUOS/copuos.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2009). For an extensive discussion of the negotiation of the Moon
Agreement within COPUOS, see 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 9-27, 46-47
(statement of Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, and testimony of S.
Neil Hosenball, Chairman, U.S. Delegation to COPUOS and General Counsel of NASA).
See also 1980 SENATE COMMITTEE STUDIES, supra note 10; PETERSON, supra note 10;
Judge Helmut Tuerk, Vice-President of the Int'l Trib. for the Law of the Sea, Address at
the Space Law Symposium 2009, The Negotiation of the "Moon Agreement," (March
23, 2009), available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/pres/lsc2OO9/sympOO.pdf.
55. See STATUS OF OUTER SPACE AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at vi.
56. As of January 2009, in addition to the thirteen state parties to the Moon
Agreement, five other states have signed but not yet ratified the agreement: France,
Guatemala, India, Romania, and Singapore. See STATUS OF OUTER SPACE AGREEMENTS,
supra note 9.
57. Compare Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, arts. I, III-V, with Moon Agreement,
supra note 8, arts. 2-4, 10.
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1. The Moon and its natural resources are the common
heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the
provisions of this Agreement and in particular in paragraph
5 of this article.
2. The Moon is not subject to national appropriation by
any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or
by any other means.
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon,
nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall
become property of any State, national organization or
nongovernmental entity or of any natural person. The
placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities,
stations and installations on or below the surface of the
Moon, including structures connected with its surface or
subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the
surface or the subsurface of the Moon or any areas thereof.
The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the
international regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this
article.
4. States Parties have the right to exploration and use of
the Moon without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international law and the
terms of this Agreement.
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to
establish an international regime, including appropriate
procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to
become feasible. This provision shall be implemented in
accordance with article 18 of this Agreement.
6. In order to facilitate the establishment of the
international regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this
article, States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of
the United Nations as well as the public and the
international scientific community, to the greatest extent
feasible and practicable, of any natural resources they may
discover on the Moon.
7. The main purposes of the international regime to be
established shall include:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural
resources of the Moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
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(c)The expansion of opportunities in the use of those
resources;
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the
benefits derived from those resources, whereby the
interests and needs of the developing countries, as well
as the efforts of those countries which have contributed
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the
Moon, shall be given special consideration.
8. All the activities with respect to the natural resources
of the Moon shall be carried out in a manner compatible
with the purposes specified in paragraph 7 of this article and
the provisions of article 6, paragraph 2, of this Agreement. 58
Article 6(2) of the agreement, which is referenced in article
11 (8), provides:
In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of
the provisions of this Agreement, the States Parties shall have
the right to collect on and remove from the Moon samples of
its minerals and other substances. Such samples shall remain
at the disposal of those States Parties which caused them to
be collected and may be used by them for scientific purposes.
States Parties shall have regard to the desirability of making a
portion of such samples available to other interested States
Parties and the international scientific community for
scientific investigation. States Parties may in the course of
scientific investigations also use mineral and other
substances of the Moon in quantities appropriate for the
support of their missions. 59
Other provisions of the agreement provide, inter alia, that,
in the exploration and use of the Moon, state parties shall pay
due regard to the interests of present and future generations,
and to the need to promote higher standards of living and
conditions of economic and social progress and development; 60
shall take measures to prevent the disruption of the existing
balance of the Moon's environment;6' may pursue their activities
on the Moon anywhere on or below its surface; 62 may establish
58. Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11.
59. Id. art. 6(2).
60. Id. art. 4.
61. Id. art. 7.
62. Id. art. 8.
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manned or unmanned stations on the Moon;63 and shall retain
jurisdiction and control over their personnel, vehicles,
equipment, facilities, stations and installations on the Moon. 64
Article 16 provides that an international organization whose
membership is comprised of a majority of state parties may
conduct activities under the agreement if it formally accepts the
agreement's obligations. 65 Article 17 permits any state party to
propose amendments to the agreement, which enter into force
for any state party accepting the amendments upon their
acceptance by a majority of states parties and thereafter for each
other party upon its individual acceptance. 66 Article 18 provides
that the U.N. Secretary General shall, at the request of one-third
of the states parties to the agreement and with the concurrence
of the majority of the states parties, convene a conference of the
states parties to review the agreement, which conference shall
also consider the question of the implementation of the
provisions of article 11, paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle
referred to in paragraph 1 of that article and taking into account
in particular any relevant technological developments. 67
It is relevant that the negotiation of the Moon Agreement in
COPUOS, and the debate over its acceptance in the United
States, took place in the context of concurrent negotiations in
New York at the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference
("UNCLOS-3"). The UNCLOS-3 negotiations developed what
was ultimately reported out by the conference as the 1982 U.N.
Law of the Sea Convention ("LOSC"). 68 During these
negotiations, the conference approved, as part XI of the LOSC,
inter alia, a highly controversial seabed mining regime-
supported by a large bloc of developing countries but strongly
opposed by the United States and certain other developed
countries-that permitted mining of seabed mineral resources
63. Id. art. 9.
64. Id. art. 12(1).
65. Id. art. 16.
66. Id. art. 17.
67. See id. art. 18.
68. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter LOSC]. As of January, 2010, 160 countries were parties to the 1982 U.N.
Law of the Sea Convention ("LOSC"). See U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the
Sea, Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the
Convention as of November 2009, http://www.un.org/depts/los/referencefiles/
chronological_lists_ofratifications. (last updated Nov. 5, 2009)
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only under the aegis of an international authority effectively
dominated by developing countries, and imposed significant
limitations on the role of private enterprise. 69 As is well known, in
1982 the Reagan administration refused to either sign or ratify
the LOSC, primarily on the grounds that the proposed
international seabed regime would both hamper the
development of seabed mineral resources and be antithetical to
free enterprise principles strongly held by the United States.70
Indeed, the United States has still not ratified the LOSC 71 despite
the U.N. General Assembly's subsequent adoption of an
implementation agreement in 1994 effectively nullifying the
provisions of part XI that the United States and some other
countries found objectionable. 72
In view of this history, it is not surprising that the Moon
Agreement, since its conclusion in 1979, has also encountered
substantial opposition in the United States and some other
countries. The phrases "common heritage of mankind" and
69. See LOSC, supra note 68, arts. 133-91, annexes III, IV (setting forth the deep
seabed regime in part XI of the convention); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 523 (1986) (summarizing the seabed
regime of the LOSC and the U.S. objections in reporter's notes 2, 3, and 4). See generally
LAw OF THE SEA: U.S. POLICY DILEMMA (Bernard H. Oxman, David D. Caron & Charles
L.O. Buderi eds., 1983); Bernard H. Oxman, The High Seas and the International Seabed
Area, 10 MICH.J. INT'L L. 526, 526-42 (1989).
70. See, e.g., President Ronald Reagan, Statement on the Convention of the Law of
the Sea, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 887, 887-88 (Jul. 9, 1982); see also Ambassador
James L. Malone, Special Representative of the President for the Third U.N. Conference
on Law of the Sea, Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the
Convention of the Law of the Sea (Aug. 12, 1982), DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 1982, 48-50;
The Law of the Sea Convention, White House Office of Policy Information, Issue
Update No. 10 (April 15, 1983), reprinted in LOUIS B. SOHN &JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 606 (2004).
71. President Clinton transmitted the convention and implementation agreement
to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in 1994. See S. TREATY DOC. No.
103-39 (1994). However, the Senate has not yet acted with regard to the convention. But
see sources cited infra note 130 (speculating as to current prospects for ratification).
72. See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 48/263, 1-13,
U.N. Doc. A/48/263 (Aug. 17, 1994) (endorsed as an annex to a resolution of the U.N.
General Assembly and adopted with 121 states in favor, none opposed, and seven
abstentions); see also Oceans and Law of the Sea, Oceans and the Law of the Sea in the
General Assembly of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
general-assembly/general-assembly-resolutions.htm. (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) For a
contemporary discussion, see, for example, Louis B. Sohn, International Law Implications
of the 1994 Agreement, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 696, 696-705 (1994), and particularly Bernard H.
Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and the Convention, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 687, 687-96 (1994).
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"international regime" in article 11 of the agreement inevitably
evoked similar phrases figuring prominently in the UNCLOS-3
negotiations and the LOSC, and raised the specter that the type
of lunar mining regime contemplated by article 11 would simply
mirror the restrictive seabed regime ultimately embodied in part
XI of the LOSC.73 Thus, a succession of industry and other
representatives strongly opposed U.S. participation in the Moon
Agreement during the treaty's 1980 congressional hearings,
arguing that: (1) it would create a moratorium on commercial
exploitation of lunar resources pending the conclusion of a more
comprehensive agreement for regulating resource activities; (2)
article 11 in any case purported to establish guiding principles
for the eventual negotiation of a successor agreement that would
very likely be contrary to free market principles and the
commercial development of outer space by private enterprise;
and (3) the agreement would give other countries, particularly
developing nations, political control over the permissibility,
timing, and direction of expanding commercial uses of outer
space.74 Responding to these concerns, and consistent with its
position on the LOSC, the Reagan administration withdrew the
Moon Agreement from consideration by the Senate and, while
never explicitly rejecting it, refused to either sign or ratify the
agreement.75 Subsequent U.S. administrations have also shown
little interest in the agreement 76 and, as previously noted, most
other countries, including all of the other space powers, have
likewise refrained from accepting the agreement to date. 77
Debate as to whether the United States should join the
Moon Agreement and as to the agreement's potential
implications for the development of lunar resources has centered
73. See Marko, supra note 10, at 319.
74. Statements were made in opposition to ratification of the agreement by the L-5
Society, 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 105-32, the American Astronautical
Society, id. at 85-93, the Aerospace Industries Association, id. at 93-103, and United
Technologies Inc., id. at 219-20. See, in particular, the testimony and statement of Leigh
S. Ratiner, Counsel for the L-5 Society, id. at 105-32, and the testimony and statement of
Marne A. Dubs, Chairman of the American Mining Congress Committee on Undersea
Mineral Resources and Vice President of Kenecott Development Corporation, id. at 132-
45. The politics of the agreement's rejection are well described in Goldman, supra note
10, at 141-47, and BASLAR, supra note 10, at 162-63.
75. See, e.g., BASLAR, supra note 10, at 162.
76. See id.
77. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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on several issues. 78 One question concerns the effect of the
provision in article 11(1) that "the Moon and its natural
resources are the common heritage of mankind. ' 79 As indicated,
opponents of U.S. participation in the agreement suggest that, as
a result of the UNCLOS-3 negotiations and part XI of the LOSC,
the phrase "common heritage of mankind" has taken on a fixed
meaning in international law to refer to resources that are not
subject to direct national or private exploitation but can rather
only be legally appropriated under the aegis of an international
organization controlled by a majority of nations-in effect, by the
bloc of developing nations, which are the most numerous.80 In
their view, the phrase reflects a particular economic and political
philosophy that would likely limit the role of the United States
and bar, or at least constrain, any significant role for the United
States or private enterprise in the exploitation of lunar
resources.
81
Proponents of the agreement, on the other hand, deny that
the "common heritage" concept has taken on any fixed meaning
in international law. 82 They maintain, instead, that the "common
heritage" concept, at least as accepted by the United States and
most developed states, reflects simply a broad international
consensus that certain very general equitable principles should
be considered as applying to such common areas or resources.
78. For detailed discussions of the various issues and arguments for and against
ratification of the Moon Agreement, see 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 2-5
(testimony of Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State). See also BASLAR, supra
note 10, at 159-85; PETERSON, supra note 10, 153-64; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note
10, at 94-177.
For detailed expressions of U.S. support of the agreement in 1979 and 1980, see
1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 9-17, 46-67 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, and S. Neil Hosenball, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to
COPUOS and NASA General Counsel), and Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the
United States, 74 AM.J. INT'L L. 418, 421-24 (1980) (excerpting in part the November 28,
1979, response of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to a joint letter from Senator's Church
and Javits of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the January 2, 1980, reply of
Assistant Secretary of StateJ. Brian Atwood to an inquiry by Senator Stone).
79. See generally BASLAR, supra note 10; POP, supra note 10, 121-33; Christol,
Common Heritage, supra note 10; Danilenko, supra note 10; Hoffstadt, supra note 10;
Jasentuliyana, supra note 10; Joyner, supra note 10; Rana, supra note 10; Rao, supra note
10.
80. See text accompanying supra note 73.
81. See BASLAR, supra note 10, at 162-63, 166-75; PETERSON, supra note 10, 159-60;
Marko, supra note 10, at 311-13.
82. See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 10, 167.
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More specifically, areas regarded as part of the "common
heritage" should not be subject to exclusive national or private
appropriation, there should be some sharing among all nations
of the benefits of such "common heritage" resources, and there
should be particular concern for the protection of the
environment in areas regarded as the "common heritage."8 3 In
support of their position, it is arguable that the U.N. General
Assembly, by approving the 1994 implementation agreement,
effectively amending part XI of the LOSC so as to remove many
of the strict constraints imposed on national or private
exploitation of seabed minerals, has now clearly rejected any
ideological or restrictive interpretation of the "common
heritage" concept.8 4 The proponents maintain, further, that the
Moon Agreement does not expressly define the term "common
heritage" and that the negotiating history of the Moon
Agreement demonstrates that the countries participating in
COPUOS intended the "common heritage" principle to have its
own meaning in the Moon Agreement, separate and distinct
from whatever meaning it may have in the LOSC.8 5 They contend
that this interpretation, insisted upon by the Soviet Union in
particular, is reflected both in the final clause of article 11 (1),
which emphasizes that the "common heritage" concept "finds its
expression in the provisions of this Agreement"8 6 (rather than in
any other agreement), and in article 11(5), which expressly
contemplates a separate negotiation to establish a resource
regime of a very general and unspecified character.87
Consequently, in this view, the parties are free, if and when they
eventually negotiate a resource regime under articles 11(5) and
18, to devise a lunar mining regime of whatever nature they
wish-which can be completely different from the LOSC seabed
regime as originally contemplated in part XI of the LOSC--
83. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 13 (statement of Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); see also Marko, supra note 10, at 319-23.
84. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
85. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 4, 14 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser to the U.S. Dep't of State).
86. Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (1).
87. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 6, 8 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); Nash, supra note 78, at 423-24 (quoting Ambassador
Richard W. Petree); see also Heim, supra note 10, at 834-35.
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subject only to the very broad criteria set forth in article 11 (7).88
Moreover, they point out that any state party that disagrees with
the type of regime negotiated under articles 11(5) and 18 can
refuse to agree to it and avoid becoming legally bound. 89
A second, related question is whether the Moon Agreement
establishes a moratorium on the conduct of resource activities by
states or private enterprises, or precludes states or private
enterprises from acquiring property rights in extracted lunar
resources pending the establishment of an international regime
negotiated under article 11 (5). As indicated above, opponents of
U.S. acceptance of the Moon Agreement contend that the
"common heritage" principle found in article 11(1) of the
agreement has taken on a fixed meaning associated with part XI
of the LOSC, and effectively mandates a moratorium and
precludes states or private entities from acquiring such rights.90
But supporters of U.S. participation in the agreement maintain
that there is nothing in article 11 or other provisions of the
Moon Agreement that suggests any such limitation on states or
private enterprises, except as they might in the future expressly
agree to such a moratorium in the context of negotiating the
international regime contemplated by article 11(5) or
otherwise. 91 Moreover, they argue that article 11(3) expressly
provides that it is only natural resources "in place" that are not
88. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 5 (testimony of Roberts Owen, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); Nash, supra note 78, at 424 (quoting Ambassador Richard
W. Petree).
89. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 4 (testimony of Roberts B.
Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
90. See, e.g., CHRISTOL, MODERN LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 10, at 165-66;
Marko, supra note 10, at 313-14.
91. For instance, U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Roberts Owens stated at the
1980 Senate Hearings:
Again, Mr. Chairman, during the negotiation of this treaty, the United
States took the position virtually from the outset that there should be no
moratorium on the exploitation of these resources pending the establishment
of the regime.
That statement was repeatedly made by the representatives of the United
States. Others acquiesced in that proposition. I think that virtually all the
lawyers who have looked at the treaty and its negotiating history agree that
during the interim, before the conference takes place in order to attempt to
establish the regime, there will be no moratorium on the exploitation of these
resources.
1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 7 (testimony of Roberts B. Owens, Legal Adviser
to the U.S. Dep't of State).
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subject to potential property or ownership rights, and that it is
clear from the negotiating history that the phrase "in place" was
specifically proposed by the United States, and accepted by the
other nations present, as a recognition that the agreement did
not imply any moratorium on the removal and ownership of
lunar resources. 92 Finally, this group contends that the right
contained in article 6(2) to collect and remove mineral and
other samples for scientific investigation cannot be reasonably
interpreted as having the negative implication that lunar
resources cannot be removed for other purposes.93
A third question is whether the agreement in any other
respect precludes private enterprise from a role in the eventual
exploitation of lunar resources. Opponents of U.S. ratification
insist that the agreement's provisions-in particular, its perceived
threat of the possible imposition of an international regime
similar to part XI of the LOSC-will discourage and, in practice,
prevent meaningful private investment or participation in the
development of lunar or other outer space resources. 94 To the
contrary, proponents of U.S. acceptance argue that the
negotiating history supports the view that the United States
successfully preserved private enterprise rights. 95 As regards to
specific provisions, they observe that articles 11(3) and 14 in
particular expressly contemplate such a role for
nongovernmental entities and that nothing in article 11 requires
that any international regime eventually negotiated be of a
nature that precludes a role for private enterprise. 96 They note
further that, while article 11(7) (d) establishes as one criteria of
such a regime an "equitable sharing by all States Parties in the
92. See BASLAR, supra note 10, at 168; Nash, supra note 78, at 422-23 (quoting then
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance); see also 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 6-7
(testimony of Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
93. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 11-12 (statement of Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
94. See id. at 109-10, 120-21 (testimony of Leigh Ratiner, Counsel, L-5 Society);
Dula, supra note 10, at 16 (arguing that the agreement would impose an "implicit" or de
facto moratorium on private enterprise development); see also Marko, supra note 10, at
314-16.
95. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 16 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); see also Goldman, supra note 10, at 144, 148
(contending that the Moon Agreement is neither a threat to the free enterprise system
nor rules out exploitation of lunar resources by private companies).
96. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 16 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
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benefits derived from those resources," 7 the term equitable
sharing is not defined and cannot in this context be construed to
mean "equal"; indeed, article 11(7) (d) expressly states that "the
efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly
or indirectly to the exploration of the moon shall be given special
consideration."98 Thus, while there appears to be an obligation to
share the benefits derived from the exploitation of lunar
resources, such as He-3, with the international community, there
is no definition of what the "benefits" to be shared are, and no
indication as to how much must be shared, with whom, or in
what form.
What, then, is the effect of the Moon Agreement on the law
applicable to the exploitation of lunar resources and, in
particular, the mining and exploitation of He-3? As indicated, the
agreement is not in itself legally binding on the United States,
nor indeed on other major space powers, or most other states,
since they are not parties.99 Arguably, the agreement should be
given little weight as evidence of developing customary law, since,
in contrast to other "space law" agreements that have achieved
widespread ratification, the Moon Agreement has, over a
considerable period, gained few adherents, none of which are
significant space powers.
But this conclusion may be too cavalier. First, as indicated,
the Moon Agreement arguably constitutes a reinforcement,
spelling-out, or agreed interpretation by the space powers and
many other concerned states participating in the COPUOS
negotiations of a number of principles and obligations already
contained or implicit in the Outer Space Treaty-which is
already legally binding on parties to that treaty. 100 Second, the
agreement reflects a long and careful process of negotiation and
accommodation in COPUOS between the states primarily
concerned with outer space and lunar activities as to the most
sensible and viable rules for the conduct of activities on the
Moon. In particular, the agreement's uncontroversial provisions,
such as those regarding the establishment of stations, 10 conduct
97. Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (7) (d).
98. Id.; see also Carl Q. Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters Into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L.
163, 165 (1985); Goldman, supra note 10, at 144.
99. See supra text accompanying note 56.
100. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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of scientific research,10 2 concern for environmental protection, 103
obligations of noninterference, 1 4 notice and consultation, 05 and
so forth can be argued to evidence, at least as to these matters, an
emerging body of customary lunar law. Thus, the Moon
Agreement will almost certainly play some role and have to be
taken into account in any further discussions concerning the
development of a lunar mining regime.
The effect of article 11 on lunar resource exploitation or
mining is, of course, more problematic. The agreement's
prohibition on exclusive national or private claims to portions of
the surface or subsurface of the Moon-and perhaps to resources
in place- 0 6simply reaffirms similar prohibitions already binding
on the United States and other states under the Outer Space
Treaty. 10 7 However, apart from any contested interpretation of
the "common heritage" provision in article 11(1) as itself
implying a moratorium on lunar mining until some kind of
LOSC part XI international regime is established, there would
appear to be nothing in article 11 or any other part of the
agreement that prohibits states or private enterprises from
mining and acquiring ownership of He-3 or other lunar
resources pending the possible establishment of any
international regime. Indeed, there is substantial support in the
language of the agreement and its negotiating history for the
legitimacy of such activities.1 08 During the 1980 Congressional
102. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. See Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4.
105. See Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 5.
106. See supra notes 58, 92 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
108. See generally discussion supra note 78, and accompanying text. In his written
statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the 1980 Senate Hearings, S.
Neil Hosenball, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to COPUOS and NASA General
Counsel, summarized the U.S. position regarding interpretation of the agreement:
The uncontradicted statements made by the United States (on the public
United Nations record of negotiations), the defeat of specific proposals by
other delegations, the reference to agreed understandings in the Committee
Report and the General Assembly Resolution adopting the Treaty in my view
conclusively establish as a matter of treaty interpretation that
(1) A state may remove and exploit natural resources from the Moon and
other celestial bodies. This conclusion is in part based on the uncontradicted
statement of the U.S. Representative, April 19, 1973. The phrase 'in place'
appears in Article 11, paragraph 3, and was as indicated proposed by the
United States.
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hearings in the U.S. Senate on the agreement, then Legal Adviser
of the U.S. State Department, Roberts Owen, concluded on this
point, "pending a Moon Conference in 15 or 30 years-and
whether or not the United States becomes a party to the Moon
Treaty-American companies will have a continuing legal right
to exploit the Moon's resources." 10 9 This conclusion has generally
One or two particular points should be made concerning these matters as
they are reflected in Working Paper 15 which the United States delegation
introduced on April 17. As is apparent from the text, this working paper
excludes the concept of a pre-regime moratorium. References to the words 'in
place' in the first sentence of that paragraph and to paragraph 7 of Article X
make this clear. More particularly, the words 'in place' in the first sentence of
paragraph 2 are intended to indicate that the prohibition against assertion of
property rights would not apply to natural resources once reduced to
possession through exploitation either in the pre-regime period or, subject to
the rules and procedures that a regime would constitute, following the
establishment of the regime. Also with regard to the last sentence of paragraph
2 of Article X, the 'without prejudice' clause would apply to exploitation
whether by a State, government entity, non-governmental enterprise or
international organization.
(2) There is no moratorium in the Treaty on exploitation of natural
resources either pre-regime or if a state chooses not to become a party to the
Treaty establishing such a regime. Proposals for such a moratorium were
submitted for the record by India, Italy and other delegations. No such
provisions appear anywhere in the Treaty and the United States through
numerous statements in the record said it would not accept a moratorium.
(4) The United States can carry out exploitation of the natural resources
of the Moon or other celestial bodies through the use of public of private
entities.
1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 59.
109. 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 6 (testimony of Roberts B. Owen, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State). More broadly, Owen went on to provide in his written
statement that:
In discussion [sic] the development of U.S. policy on the exploitation
matter, I wish to stress that the United States constantly maintained several
themes, which I would like to set forth and illustrate through references to the
negotiating history of the Treaty.
First, the United States was willing to accept the concept that the natural
resources of celestrial [sic] bodies were the common heritage of mankind.
Indeed, it was the United States which first proposed the phrase in the course
of active negotiations. However, the U.S. view was-and is-that this concept
embodies no substantive rules or a pre-determined form of legal regime, and
the United States has consistently resisted efforts to give the phrase content
which would be adverse to U.S. interests. In our view the phrase can acquire
substantive meaning only by reference to the specific context in which it is
employed.
Secondly, the United States has consistently rejected any suggestion that
the Moon Treaty should impose a moratorium on unilaterial [sic] exploitation
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been supported by leading experts,110 in the deliberations and
report of the Space Law Committee of the International Law
Association at its 1982 Montreal meeting,"' and, notably, by the
current parties to the Moon Agreement in a Joint Statement
submitted to the most recent 2009 meeting of the legal
subcommittee of COPUOS.112
In sum, while the Outer Space Treaty, perhaps as
supplemented by the Moon Agreement, establishes a useful
framework for many prospective activities on the Moon and
clearly prohibits staking exclusive national or private claims to
particular areas of the lunar surface, neither the treaty nor the
agreement appears to preclude the mining and acquisition of
property rights in lunar He-3 by national, international, or
private enterprises, subject to certain broad "common heritage"
obligations, such as the obligation to share to some unclear
of nonterrestrial natural resources pending the establishment of an
international regime; indeed, we have insisted that even after such a regime is
established, the right of unilaterial [sic] exploitation will continue to be
available to those States which do not choose to participate in such a regime.
Third, the United States has been aware of the vital role that American
free enterprise can play in outer space, and the U.S. positions were designed to
promote this role, both by ensuring that nothing in the Treaty would
circumscribe this potential and by inserting into the Treaty certain rights
which would be important to commercial exploitation by private or public
entities.
Id. at 12.
110. See, e.g., POP, supra note 10, at 146-47 (concluding, after surveying the
literature, that most commentators consider that article 11 of the Moon Agreement does
not establish any temporary prohibition on the appropriation or exploitation of lunar
resources pending the establishment of some lunar resource regime); see also sources
cited supra note 10.
111. See Goedhuis, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 479-531 (including commentary on
various questions put to the International Law Association Space Law Committee). The
Sixtieth Conference expressly noted in its Resolution Number 10 that it "[i]s of the
opinion that under the terms of the Agreement of the Moon Treaty there is no
moratorium on the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon, prior to the
establishment of the international regime as provided for in Article XII(5) of this
Agreement." The Montreal Conference Resolutions, 60 INT'L L. ASS'N CONF. REP. 1, 12
(1982). For a discussion by a member of the International Law Association Space
Committee, see Williams, Law of Outer Space, supra note 10.
112. See COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., Joint Statement on the Benefits of Adherence to the
Agreement Governing the Activities of State on the Moon or Other Celestial Bodies by States Parties
to the Agreement, 7(e), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.272 (Apr. 3, 2008) (declaring that
the Moon Agreement "does not propose a closed and complete mechanism" and "does
not preclude any modality of exploitation, by public or private entities, or prohibit the
commercialization of such resources, provided that such exploitation is compatible with
the principle of the common heritage of mankind").
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extent the benefits or proceeds of such activities. However,
whatever the merits of this conclusion, it will clearly remain open
to at least vigorous political as well as legal challenges-
particularly by developing or other states currently unable to
participate in lunar mining or other activities. Moreover, the
Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement, and international law
more generally, leave many other significant questions
concerning the potential exploitation of He-3 or other lunar
resources unresolved. Consequently, if the United States or other
space powers that intend to establish stations on the Moon plan
to proceed with mining lunar He-3 in connection with their
potential development of an He-3-based fusion power program,
they will be doing so under conditions of substantial legal and
political-not to mention technological and economic-
uncertainty. The question, then, is whether the United States
should do something to remedy this situation and, if so, what?
III. SHOULD THE UNITED STA TES SEEK INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT ON A LUNAR RESOURCE REGIME?
As indicated, there does not at present appear to be any
legal barrier to the United States engaging in lunar mining, save
for the very general limitations imposed by the Outer Space
Treaty and broader international law. 113 Moreover, as a practical
matter, no other nation is likely in the near future to be in a
position to prevent the United States from establishing a lunar
base and conducting activities on the Moon as it wishes. 114
Consequently, the United States could presumably proceed with
an He-3-based fusion energy program on the assumption that it
could mine and bring to Earth lunar He-3 without any need for
seeking further international approval. Under this approach, the
United States could develop an appropriate legal regime of its
own, consistent with its own needs and principles, rather than
having to reach compromises with other countries. There is
precedent for unilateral U.S. action of this kind-the 1980
113. See discussion supra Part II.
114. See, e.g., James Clay Moltz, Toward Cooperation or Conflict on the Moon?:
Considering Lunar Governance in Historical Perspective, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., 82, 89-99
(2009).
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United States Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 115
which, following U.S. rejection of the 1982 LOSC, continues to
govern the commercial recovery of deep seabed minerals by U.S.
companies. 116 Subsequent to its enactment, the United States
concluded international agreements with several other states in
1982 and 1984 (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to resolve overlapping
claims with respect to mining areas for polymetallic nodules of
the deep seabed.1' 7
However, even if the United States could "go it alone" in
this way, there are reasons why it may not wish to do so. First,
neither the U.S. government nor U.S. private enterprise is likely
to be willing to risk the very substantial investment and long-term
effort necessarily involved in seeking to develop He-3-based
fusion energy without some assurance that-assuming the very
difficult technical and engineering obstacles to developing
efficient fusion reactors and establishing permanent moon bases
can be overcome-the requisite supply of lunar He-3 can
continue to be obtained without encountering significant legal or
political difficulties. Whatever may be the most legally persuasive
interpretation of existing international law, other nations or
people on Earth may challenge the unilateral appropriation of
lunar resources by the United States, especially of a potentially
uniquely valuable resource such as He-3. This, certainly, was the
international experience in the 1960's when developing nations
vigorously protested the prospect that a few technologically-
advanced countries and their private enterprises might alone
appropriate what was at the time assumed to be the mineral
riches of the deep seabed. That perception ultimately led to the
enunciation of the "common heritage" doctrine, the convening
of UNCLOS-3, and the adoption of part XI of the 1982 LOSC."18
Only a broadly accepted international agreement is likely to offer
115. See Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553
(1980) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-73 (2006)).
116. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 523 rep. n. 5 (1987).
117. See Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters, Aug. 3, 1984,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,066, 1409 U.N.T.S. 463; Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements
Relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, Sept. 2, 1982, 34 U.S.T. 3451,
1871 U.N.T.S. 275; see also SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 294-95;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 523, supra note 116, n.5.
118. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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the continued legal and political predictability that is essential if
a long-term He-3-based fusion energy program is to be
undertaken and sustained.11 9
Second, current commitments already obligate the United
States to a certain level of international cooperation in space
activities. While the Outer Space Treaty and present
international law do not expressly bar the unilateral
appropriation of lunar resources, they nevertheless impose an
obligation on nations to cooperate in outer space activities and to
avoid conduct that might give rise to disputes. 120 The United
States is also committed to international cooperation in outer
space activities under the Outer Space Treaty, the multinational
framework for coordination in space exploration entitled "The
Global Exploration Strategy,"' 21 and other agreements, such as
the International Space Station Agreement,122 and has similarly
119. See, e.g., Press Release, Int'l Inst. of Space Law, Statement of the Board of
Directors of the International Institute of Space Law (Mar. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/statement-bod.pdf ("At present, international space
legislation does not include detailed provisions with regard to the exploitation of natural
resources of outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies, although it does set down
a general framework for the conduct of all space activities, including those of private
persons and companies, with respect to such natural resources. The [International
Institute of Space Law] is of the opinion that a specific legal regime for the exploitation
of [lunar] resources should be elaborated through the [U.N.], on the basis of present
international space law, for the purposes of clarity and legal certainty in the near
future.").
120. See supra note 52, and accompanying text; see also International Cooperation
in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 63/90, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/90 (Dec. 18,
2008). It is noteworthy that the Russian Federation and India have signed a ten-year
cooperation agreement, which commenced December 2007, for the development of a
shared space vehicle for Moon exploration. See COPUOUS, Note by the U.N. Secretariat,
supra note 2, 15.
121. See NASA, GLOBAL EXPLORATION STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 12 ("The shared
challenges of space exploration and the common motivation to answer fundamental
scientific questions encourage nations of all sizes to work together in a spirit of
friendship and cooperation.").
122. Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member
States of the European Space Agency, the Government of'Japan, the Government of the
Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America Concerning
Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12,927;
see Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Governments of
Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and the
Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development,
Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, Sept. 29,
1988, Temp. State Dep't No. 92-65, 1992 WL 466295; Arrangement Concerning
Application of the Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement Pending Its Entry into
Force, Sept. 29, 1988, Temp State Dep't No. 88-336, 1988 WL 409764; see also Katherine
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committed itself to international cooperation in developing
fusion energy through its participation in the recently concluded
ITER agreement. 123 U.S. insistence on a right to unilaterally
appropriate lunar He-3, without further international agreement,
could be controversial and regarded as inconsistent with these
precedents.
Finally, if countries other than the United States also engage
in activities on the Moon, as now appears highly likely, it will be
in the interest of each of them to have at least some
understandings to provide for cooperation on common problems
and keep them from interfering with each other's activities. As
the Moon Agreement anticipates,12 4 if some kind of lunar
agreement is in their common interests, it will be difficult for
such an agreement to not address the salient and thus far
unresolved issue of lunar resources exploitation.
Consequently, if the United States determines that it is
serious about seeking to develop an He-3-based fusion energy
program, it would seem sensible for it to also seek international
agreement on a lunar resource regime designed to provide the
long-term legal and political stability that such a program will
most likely require.
M. Gorove, The US./International Space Station Agreement of September 29, 1988. Some Legal
Highlights, 16 J. SPACE L. 182, 182-84 (1988); David C. Stewart, Note, Resolution of Legal
Issues Confronting the International Space Station Project: A Step Forward in the Development of
Space Law, 29 VA.J. INT'L L. 745, 745-61 (1989); cf. Press Release, Office of Sci. & Tech.
Pol'y, Exec., Office of the President, Statement of U.S. National Space Policy (Oct. 6,
2006), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/policy/national/
us-space-policy-060831.pdf ("The United States will seek to cooperate with other nations
in the peaceful use of outer space to extend the benefits of space, enhance space
exploration, and to protect and promote freedom around the world.").
123. See supra note 23.
124. See Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11; see also supra text accompanying
note 60.
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IV. POLICY OPTIONS FOR A FUTURE LUNAR RESOURCE
REGIME
A. Should the United States Try to Establish an Acceptable
International Regime Even Before Lunar Mining and He-3-Based
Fusion Power Are Feasible?
There are clearly arguments that, given the current
uncertainty as to the feasibility of both establishing a permanent
U.S. lunar base capable of carrying on He-3 mining activities and
developing fusion reactors that economically warrant investment
in the creation of a major He-3-based fusion power program, it
would be premature at this time for the United States to
negotiate a lunar mining regime with other countries. 125 Other
countries are unlikely to see a need for such negotiations at this
time and, in any event, it is certainly arguable that the countries
concerned simply do not now know enough to do a sensible job
in this respect. Indeed, it was for this reason that COPUOS, in
drafting article 11 of the Moon Agreement, expressly deferred
the negotiation of such a regime to such time "as such
exploitation is about to become feasible." 126
There are, however, several reasons suggesting that the U.S.
should seek to reach international agreement on such a regime
quite soon and even before the possibility and practicality of a
permanent moon base and an He-3-based fusion power program
are clearly established. First, as discussed, states and enterprises
are unlikely to be willing to undertake the substantial effort and
investment involved in developing lunar He-3 mining and He-3-
based fusion power without the assurance of political and legal
stability that only a broadly accepted international agreement can
provide. 127 Given the long lead time which will be required if the
United States wishes to achieve a viable He-3-based fusion power
program in the relatively near future-perhaps within the next
half-century or so-it seems sensible for it to begin to take steps
to put the necessary legal infrastructure in place fairly soon.
Second, the international climate is arguably now relatively
favorable to achieving international agreement on the kind of
125. See sources cited supra note 5.
126. See Moon Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11 (5); see also supra text accompanying
note 58.
127. See discussion supra notes 118-19.
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international lunar resource regime the United States hopes to
achieve. Other major players, such as China, the European
Union, India, Japan, and Russia, which currently appear to have
the capability to participate in the potential exploitation of lunar
resources, may well now share an interest with the United States
in a more open-access regime and market-based mechanisms. 128
The U.N. General Assembly's adoption of the 1994
implementation agreement nullifying the provisions of part XI of
the LOSC to which the United States objected clearly reflects a
broader international acceptance of a U.S.-favored approach to
the exploitation of deep seabed "common heritage" resources
more favorable to the participation of free enterprise, which
serves as persuasive precedent for the similar treatment of lunar
resources. 129 Indeed, there is now growing support in the United
States for U.S. ratification of the LOSC and accession currently
seems increasingly likely.130  In addition, international
128. See, e.g., Michio Kaku, The New Race for the Moon: A Lot of Nations are Looking to
Repeat Apollo's Feat, WALL ST. J., Jun. 24, 2009, at A13 (describing global ambitions to
mine the Moon).
129. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (relating to U.S. objections to part
XI of the LOSC).
130. For a summary by the State Department of continuing U.S. administrations
support of the LOSC, see U.S. Dep't of State: Law of the Sea Convention,
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/ocns/opa/convention/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
The George W. Bush administration explicitly supported U.S. accession. See Press
Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in
the World's Oceans (May 15, 2007), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/
20070515-2.html; see also Kevin D. Futch, Introductoy Note on the President's Statement on
Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans, 46 I.L.M. 886, 886 (2007). For a review on
the Bush administration's arguments supporting accession by the Legal Adviser to the
State Department, see John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The
United States and the Law of the Sea Convention (Nov. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/5-bellinger.pdf. See also John R. Crook, President
Urges Senate Approval of Law of the Sea Convention, 101 AM.J. INT'L L. 650, 650-51 (2007);
John R. Crook, Law of the Sea Treaty Reported Out of Committee; Timing and Prospects for Full
Senate Action Unknown, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 168, 168 (2008); John R. Crook, Senate
Approves Numerous Treaties, Not Including the Law of the Sea Convention, 103 AM.J. INT'L L.
135, 135-36 (2009).
On April 6, 2009, at ajoint session of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting and
the Arctic Council, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that the United States
was "committed" to ratifying the Law of the Sea Convention. Hilary Rodham Clinton,
U.S Sec'y of State, Remarks at the Joint Session of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Meeting and the Arctic Council, 50th Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty (Apr. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/04/121314.htm. On May 11,
2009, the Department of State listed the LOSC as one of the seventeen treaties on its
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cooperation among the major technologically-advanced
countries in both space and fusion power development is already
ongoing under the International Space Station and ITER
agreements1 ' and the Obama administration appears to look
favorably on cooperative multilateral rather than unilateral
approaches to dealing with broad international issues.13 2
Moreover, the recent spike in oil prices133 and heightened
international concern about global warming134 reinforce the
pressing need of the global economy to find ways to meet the
world's growing appetite for energy while still decreasing
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus to renewed international
interest in the development of alternative energy sources such as
nuclear fission and fusion.
Third, for a variety of reasons, the current influence and
"bargaining power" of the United States both as a leader in space
and nuclear technology, and more generally as an actor on the
world stage, is arguably declining relative to that of China, the
European Union, India, Russia, and other countries.13 5 If this is
so, the ability of the United States to negotiate the kind of lunar
resource regime it wants may well be greater now than later.
"Treaty Priority List" from which the Administration seeks Senate advice and consent "at
this time." Letter from Richard R. Verma, Assistant Sec'y, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State, to Senator John Kerry, Chairman of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
(May 11, 2009), available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/
2009TreatyPriorityList.pdf.
131. See supra notes 23, 121.
132. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Surprise Nobel for Obama Stirs
Praise and Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009, at Al.
133. See, e.g., Daniel Yergin, It's Still the One, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2009,
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/17/itsstill_the-one.
134. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, Biggest Obstacle to Global Climate Deal May Be How
to Pay for It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at A6.
135. See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008) (arguing that
the rise of new global powers inevitably means the relative decline of U.S. influence); see
also NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE,
GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD vi (2008), http://www.dni.gov/nic/
PDF_2025/2025_GlobalTrends FinalReport.pdf ("Although the United States is likely
to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States' relative strength-even in
the military realm-will decline and U.S. leverage will become more constrained.");
Scott Shane, Global Forecast by American Intelligence Expects Al Qaeda's Appeal to Falter, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A14; Pamela Hess, Intelligence Report: Say Farewell to American
Supremacy, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/
11/20/intelligence-report-say-f n_145376.html.
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Finally, it may be easier to establish the type of lunar
resource regime that the United States would prefer while the
feasibility of He-3 exploitation and fusion power-and, indeed,
the possibility that we may eventually find valuable resources
elsewhere in the solar system-is still uncertain and before
potentially concerned states have developed important stakes in
particular outcomes.
B. Wat Kind of Lunar Resource Regime Should the United States Try
to Obtain?
Consistent with its past positions regarding the mineral
resource provisions of both the Moon Agreement'3 6 and the
LOSC,137 the United States will presumably wish to seek a lunar
resource regime having at least the following characteristics:
Provisions permitting and facilitating the exploration and
development of lunar resources by the United States or its private
companies. To begin, the regime should permit the United States
or its private companies to conduct, without burdensome
regulation or interference, any and all of the activities reasonably
necessary to prospect for, explore, mine, process, and either use
or transport to Earth lunar resources, in particular He-3. The
regime must clearly provide for acquiring property rights in
minerals or other substances removed from the Moon's surface
or subsoil, the effective operation of and control over necessary
stations or facilities, jurisdiction over necessary personnel, some
measure of exclusivity over areas subject to resource activities,
and some measure of privacy over proprietary information. The
regime should also provide or permit a national or international
management structure for He-3 production, marketing, and sales
that permits timely decisions, within general guidelines, on all
aspects of operational management. In particular, the regime
should ensure the retention by the United States or its private
companies of reasonable proceeds or profits commensurate with
the effort involved and sufficient to encourage and warrant the
level of investment involved.
A role for private enterprise. The regime should expressly allow
and encourage private enterprise to play a significant role in the
136. See generally 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10.
137. See supra notes 70, 129 and accompanying text.
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exploration and use of lunar resources, subject to appropriate
and reasonable regulation. This means that private enterprise
must have assurance of security of tenure during the life of
mining operations and the right to earn and retain reasonable
profits. Environmental regulations should be designed and used
solely to minimize the impact of mining operations on the
environment, to a degree consistent with economic viability of
the operations. Any permitting process should be simple, direct,
and prompt.
Consistency with international law. The regime should be
consistent with existing U.S. obligations under the Outer Space
Treaty, U.N. Charter, other international instruments, and
customary international law. This recognition would include the
obligations not to claim title to territory on the Moon,138 to
respect the right of other states to conduct activities there,'139 and
to conduct any activities with due respect for environmental
concerns.
140
Recognition of broader international community concerns. The
regime should recognize that the international community as a
whole has legitimate interests in the exploration and use of the
Moon and its resources. All states should have the right to
conduct activities on the Moon without discrimination.1 41 The
regime should recognize that the international community is
entitled to share the benefits of lunar exploitation. 142 However,
any form of benefit sharing must be consistent with the right of
the states and private enterprises primarily involved and in
mineral or other resource activities to a principal role in
decisions relating to the conduct of such activities and to a fair
profit and return for their investment and effort. The regime
should also require that all states conducting activities on the
Moon must meet their obligations to the broader international
community and to future generations by ensuring that their
activities do not cause significant environmental or other
damage.1 43
138. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Encouragement of international cooperation. The regime should
encourage cooperation rather than competition among states
conducting activities on the Moon, such as open access and
reasonable exchanges of information, mutual assistance in
situations of need, and joint activities where appropriate.
Dispute-avoidance and settlement procedures. The regime should
contain provisions for the avoidance and peaceful resolution of
disputes, including obligations requiring prior notification of
actions likely to affect other states and consultation if problems,
difficulties, or controversies arise.
Flexibility. The regime should include provisions permitting
and facilitating its prompt revision and development as lunar
activities proceed and the need for additional or different
regulatory measures or arrangements becomes apparent. Again,
the regime should recognize the right of states and enterprises
primarily involved, and actually planning or engaged in resource
activities to a prominent role in decisions relating to changes in
or development of the regime.
C. How Should the United States Seek to Achieve an Acceptable
International Lunar Resource Regime?
What steps might the United States take to try to achieve an
acceptable lunar resource regime? Should it ratify and accede to
the Moon Agreement, possibly with reservations, and then move
within the article 11 and 18 framework of that agreement to
negotiate such a regime? Should it negotiate an acceptable
regime beforehand as a condition precedent to its acceptance of
the Moon Agreement-perhaps in the form of a proposed
agreed amendment or protocol pursuant to article 18 of the
agreement-only then joining the agreement with the assurance
that the proposed agreed-upon regime will be incorporated
within the Moon Agreement's framework? Should it instead seek
a new amendment or protocol to the Outer Space Treaty,
making clear the right of its parties to acquire and utilize lunar
or other extraterrestrial resources? Or should it seek to negotiate,
either on a broad or a narrow multilateral basis, an entirely new
agreement, embodying the type of regime it considers
acceptable, outside the framework of the present Moon
Agreement or Outer Space Treaty? Finally, regardless of the way
that the United States seeks to establish a lunar mining regime
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ensuring it access to lunar He-3, should it also seek to establish,
together with other concerned countries and perhaps interested
private enterprises, an international or quasi-international entity
for the cooperative mining of lunar He-3, and possibly even for
the terrestrial development of a global He-3-based fusion energy
program?
1. Should the United States Accede to the Moon Agreement?
Ratifying the Moon Agreement, under conditions which
assure that a lunar resource regime acceptable to the United
States will eventually be established under articles 11 and 18 of
the agreement may be the simplest way of achieving the U.S.
objective of providing a stable legal and political environment in
support of a long-term commitment to an He-3-based fusion
energy program. The arguments in favor of reconsidering the
past refusal of the United States to ratify the Moon Agreement
are as follows.
First, the Moon Agreement is currently the principal "game
in town"-the only international instrument specifically designed
to deal with issues relating to the exploration of the Moon and
the use of its resources. It represents the best efforts and
embodies the carefully considered compromises and pragmatic
accommodations of some seven years of negotiation by the
United States and the principal space powers and other states
most concerned. As indicated, the United States fully
participated and achieved most of its objectives in this long,
drawn-out negotiation. 144 With the arguable exception of article
11, the agreement provides a broadly sensible and non-
controversial set of rules for the conduct of lunar activities
already in place. 145 Indeed, the legal subcommittee of COPUOS,
at both its most recent 2008 and 2009 meetings, devoted
considerable time to a discussion of the reasons for low
participation in the Moon Agreement, the benefits of adherence
to the agreement, and the possibility of revision of the agreement
144. See 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 9-17, 56-67 (statement of Roberts B.
Owen, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, and S. Neil Hosenball, Chairman, U.S.
Delegation to COPUOS and General Counsel of NASA).
145. See supra notes 58, 73-98, 106-12 and accompanying text (discussing article 11
of the Moon Agreement).
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so as to encourage broader participation. 146 Given this history,
the United States could have difficulty persuading other states of
the need to embark on a completely new negotiation.
Second, whatever their merits at the time, the arguments
presented in 1980 in opposition to U.S. ratification of the
agreement appear now even less persuasive. As discussed,
suggestions that the Moon Agreement-and more particularly its
"common heritage" language-establishes a moratorium on
lunar mining, precludes a role for private enterprise, or
prescribes any particular type of international regime applicable
to lunar resource exploitation, particularly some kind of regime
dominated by developing nations, find little support in either the
language of the agreement or its negotiating history. 147 In
particular, it seems clear that, while article 11 appears to require
good faith efforts to negotiate an international regime at such
time as resource exploitation becomes likely, it neither mandates
that the regime take any particular form-particularly one
mirroring the original (pre-1994 implementation agreement)
LOSC seabed regime-nor requires state parties to accept any
regime with which they are not satisfied. Moreover, the criteria
set out in article 11(7) for any such regime appear generally
consistent with U.S. objectives. 148 Finally, as indicated, the U.N.
General Assembly's adoption of the 1994 implementation
agreement modifying the provisions of part XI of the LOSC to
which the United States strongly objected, suggests that the
international community, particularly the technically advanced
countries most concerned and likely to be involved in lunar
exploration and development, can now be expected to be
146. See COPUOS, Legal Subcomm., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Forty-
Eighth Session, 11 32-33, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/935 (Apr. 20, 2009); COPUOS, Legal
Subcomm., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Forty-Seventh Session, 42, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/917 (Apr. 18, 2008); Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on the Status and
Application of the five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, 14-25, COPUOS, Legal
Subcomm., Report of the Legal Subcommittee on its Forty-Seventh Session, annex I, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/917 (Apr. 18, 2008); see also COPUOS, supra note 112 (contending that even
though the Moon Agreement contains provisions that develop principles set out in the
Outer Space Treaty, other provisions are unique to the agreement and clarify or
complement principles, procedures, and notions contained in other outer space
treaties).
147. See supra notes 58, 78, 82-93, 95-98, and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 74, 95-98, and accompanying text.
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receptive to the kind of lunar resource regime the United States
would find acceptable. 149
Third, while U.S. ratification of the Moon Agreement would
not in itself provide a detailed lunar resource regime acceptable
to the United States 150 the United States could, and should,
condition or structure such ratification and accession in a way
designed to ensure that, either before or after U.S. ratification
and accession, an acceptable resource regime will in fact be
adopted by the parties to the agreement. Some possibilities for
seeking to ensure this result are discussed below.
Fourth, to the extent that concerns as to the meaning or
ideological implications of the agreement continue to pose a
political obstacle to U.S. ratification, such concerns could also be
met through appropriate U.S. reservations, declarations, or
understandings to its ratification of the agreement. For example,
in 1982 the American Bar Association's House of Delegates
approved a joint report of the American Bar Association sections
on International Law and on Natural Resources Law
recommending U.S. ratification accompanied by declarations
consistent with the following principles:
(a) It is the position of the United States that no
provision in this Agreement constrains the existing right of
governmental or authorized non-governmental entities to
explore and use the resources of the Moon or other celestial
body, including the right to develop and use these resources
for commercial or other purposes, and no such constraint is
accepted by this ratification;
(b) It is the position of the United States that nothing
in this Agreement in any way diminishes or alters the existing
right of the United States to determine unilaterally how it
shares the benefits derived from development and use by or
under the authority of the United States of natural resources
of the Moon or other celestial bodies;
(c) Natural resources extracted or used by or under the
authority of a State Party to this Agreement are subject to the
exclusive control of, and shall be the property of the State
149. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 67, 87-88, and accompanying text (explaining that only state
parties acting collectively can participate in establishing such a regime under articles 11
and 18 of the agreement).
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Party or other authorized entity responsible for their
extraction or use. In this context, it is the position of the
United States that Articles XII and XV of this Agreement
preserve the existing right of States Parties to retain exclusive
jurisdiction and control over their facilities, stations and
installations on the Moon and other celestial bodies, and that
other State Parties are obligated to avoid interference with
normal operations of such facilities;
(d) Recognition by the United States that the Moon
and its natural resources are the common heritage of all
mankind is limited to recognition (i) that all States have
equal rights to explore and use the Moon and its natural
resources, and (ii) that no State or other entity has an
exclusive right of ownership over the Moon, over any area of
the surface or subsurface of the moon, or over its natural
resources which have not been, or are not actually in the
process of being, extracted or used by actual development
activities on the Moon;
(e) It is the position of the United States that no
moratorium on the commercial or other exploration,
development and use of the natural resources of the Moon
or other celestial body is intended or required by this
Agreement. The United States recognizes that, in the
development and use of natural resources on the Moon,
States Parties to this Agreement are obligated to act in a
manner compatible with the provisions of Article VI(2) and
the purposes specified in Article XI(7), and the purposes
specified in Article XI(7). However, the United States
reserves to itself the right and authority to determine the
standards for such compatibility unless and until the United
States becomes a party to a future resources regime;
(f) Acceptance by the United States of the obligation to
join in good faith negotiation for creation of a future
resources regime in no way constitutes acceptance of any
particular provisions or proposed provisions which may be
included in an agreement creating and controlling such a
regime; nor does it constitute any obligation or commitment
to become a Party to such a regime regardless of the contents
of any such agreement.15 1
151. See ABA Section of International Law & Section of Natural Resources Law,
Recommendation to the ABA House of Delegates, 465 (Jan. 25-26, 1982), reprinted in
Carl Q. Christol, The American Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: The Search for a
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It is true, of course, that U.S. accession to the Moon
Agreement would involve risks, such as those raised in the 1980
Senate hearings, based on a pessimistic prediction of the likely
outcome of any eventual article 11 and 18 negotiations. 152 Thus,
U.S. accession might well encourage wider participation in the
agreement by many non-space powers and developing states-
countries that might have a different ideology and approach to
the exploitation of lunar resources from that of the United
States. Conceivably, if these nations constituted a majority of
parties to the agreement, they might succeed in imposing a
resource regime unacceptable to the United States in any future
article 11 and 18 negotiations. In this event, U.S. accession to the
Moon Agreement could result in embedding and legitimating a
lunar resource regime embodying principles contrary to U.S.
interests. Moreover, U.S. accession might, in this case, effectively
preclude its pursuit of alternative, more hopeful strategies. While
it is true that under the agreement the U.S. is not legally obliged
to agree to any eventual international regime that it does not
like, it might by that time be impractical for the United States to
either "go it alone" or seek some other agreement.
However, there are various approaches the United States
could employ to alleviate these concerns. For example:
0 The United States could indicate to the current parties to
the Moon Agreement that it was prepared to ratify and
accede to the agreement, conditional on their first acting
under article 11 and 18 to adopt a lunar resource regime
reflecting principles acceptable to the United States.
Conceivably, the present parties might value U.S.
adherence sufficiently to adopt such a regime. However,
since none of the current parties are now, or likely in the
future to be, involved in lunar resource activities, they
might not be best suited to fashioning the kind of
resource regime the United States would hope to have
established.
Position, 9J. SPACE L. 77, 90 (1981). On the position of the American Bar Association,
see 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 67-85 (testimony and statement of Ronald F.
Stowe, Chairman, Aerospace Law Committee of the American Bar Association Section
on International Law). See also Christol, supra, at 77-90.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 90, 94.
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" The United States could negotiate an agreement with like-
minded countries having a present or potential
spacefaring capability and concern with the effective
development of lunar resources, such as China, the
European Union, India, Japan, and Russia, for the
proposed simultaneous accession by each of them to the
Moon Agreement, coupled with a joint declaration
indicating their intent, upon their accession, to move
under article 18 to establish an acceptable resource
regime meeting U.S. requirements. The combined
influence of these major powers would presumably be
sufficient to ensure the adoption by all of the parties to
the agreement of such a regime.
* Perhaps preferably, the United States could, more
broadly, negotiate with both the current parties to the
agreement, the other principal space powers, and other
interested states for specific terms of an acceptable
proposed lunar resource regime, with the understanding
or express agreement that, if the United States and other
non-party states then joined the agreement, both the old
and new parties would then promptly agree to call an
article 18 conference to formally adopt this previously
agreed upon lunar resource regime.
" Alternatively, while the United States could not propose
amendment of the Moon Agreement since it is not a
current party, it could, as a member of COPUOS, propose
the negotiation in COPUOS, and perhaps adoption by the
U.N. General Assembly, of a protocol or additional
instrument supplementing the Moon Agreement
providing for a lunar resource regime acceptable to the
United States, with the understanding that it would ratify
the agreement and protocol or additional instrument only
if the protocol or additional instrument received
sufficient acceptance, including acceptance by the other
principal space powers, so as to enter into force as
binding upon all parties. This approach would, of course,
be similar to that followed by the U.N. General Assembly
in its adoption of an implementation agreement in 1994
effectively nullifying the provisions of part XI of the LOSC
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to which the United States and some other states
objected. 153
As already mentioned, the current parties to the agreement
might be willing to agree to one of these possible arrangements
in order to encourage and facilitate participation by the United
States and other space powers in the agreement.154 Discussions in
recent meetings of the Legal Committee of COPUOS suggest
that the parties to the Moon Agreement, as well as other states,
are actively exploring the possibility of reisions, arrangements,
or other accommodations that might persuade the United States
and other countries to ratify and accede to the agreement. 55
Once again, international experience with the analogous
situation involving seabed minerals is suggestive, where a majority
of states in the U.N. General Assembly were prepared to
negotiate and adopt the 1994 implementation agreement
modifying the mineral resource regime set out in part XI of the
LOSC in the hope of encouraging the United States and other
important states to join the LOSC. 156
2. Should the United States Attempt to Establish an
International Lunar Resource Regime Outside of the Framework
of the Present Moon Agreement?
While this Article suggests that there are now good
arguments for the United States to ratify and accede to the Moon
Agreement, preferably-and collectively-with other space
powers, under arrangements that would ensure that the legal
regime established pursuant to article 11 fully satisfies U.S.
requirements, 57 the fact remains that U.S. ratification may not
currently be politically attainable. As was the case when the
agreement was first presented to the Senate in 1980, influential
and respected individuals and groups within the United States
continue to strongly oppose U.S. ratification. They remained
convinced that the agreement's fundamental cast, especially its
provisions characterizing lunar resources as the "common
heritage of mankind" and mandating the establishment of an
153. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
157. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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"international regime," will in practice inhibit the private and
public development and exploitation of He-3 and other lunar
resources, and, in particular, create such uncertainty for private
enterprise as to effectively discourage, if not prevent, private
investment and industry from playing any meaningful role in the
exploitation of such resources-a role they believe essential to
the successful commercial development of such resources. 158 It
158. For a cogent statement of the arguments against U.S. ratification of the Moon
Agreement, see SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 286-95. Noting the
various issues raised in the 1980 Senate Hearings concerning article 11 and other
provisions of the agreement, Schmitt states:
[A] one nation, one vote, [U.N.] style organization ... seems very unlikely to
be workable even though such an organization is envisioned by the 1979 Moon
Agreement.... The inevitable politicization of decision-making in such
organizations, and the stagnation which invariably results, argues against ...
[its being suitable] for complex technical endeavors.
Id. at 151.
[T]he opportunities and benefits of private enterprise in developing lunar
resources would disappear if the United States should ratify the Moon
Agreement. If international political interference with a Return to the Moon is
to be avoided, the United States and other spacefaring nations should
unequivocally reject this Agreement ....
Id. at 292. Schmitt concludes that:
The Moon Agreement, if ratified by major spacefaring nations, would create a
high degree of uncertainty that is antithetical to private commercial activities
on the Moon. The Agreement would, in effect, create a defacto moratorium on
such activities. A mandated international management regime would both
complicate national and private commercial efforts and give other countries
political control over the permissibility, timing and management of all
commercial and national resource activities on the Moon.
Id. at 295. Instead, Schmitt proposes:
In removing the Moon Agreement from the playing field, the United States
and other nations could state that their policy will be to license competent
entities to bring lunar resources to Earth under the general authority and
constraints of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. More proactively, these nations
could state in policy and law that, under specific conditions, they will recognize
a private entity, or other entity's property and mineral rights within a
requested area on the Moon. [Schmitt goes on to suggest such conditions].
Id. at 293-94; see also Lunar Exploration: Hearing on Lunar Exploration Before the Subcomm.
on Science, Technology and Space of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, Chairman, Interlune-
Intermars Initiative, Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/
schmittl10603.doc [hereinafter 2003 Lunar Exploration Hearings]. Doctor Schmitt
currenly is Chairman of Interlune-Intermars Initiative, Inc., an organization with the
goal of advancing private sector acquisition and use of lunar resources. See BASLAR, supra
note 10, at 161-90 (broadly discussing what he considers problems with the Moon
Agreement); G.H. Reynolds, Return of the Moon Treaty: The Monster L-5 Slew Lives Again,
AD ASTRA, May-June 1994, at 27, 28 (stating that the creation of an international
MINING OF HELIUM-3 ON THE MOON
may be argued that, given the risks and uncertainty necessarily
involved in the development of lunar He-3-based fusion energy,
the enormous investment certainly required, and the likely very
long time horizon before any financial return, the prospect of
private enterprises choosing to play a leading role in He-3 or
other lunar resource development-at least without substantial
government assistance-is open to question. 159 However, the
1980 Senate hearings and subsequent lack of administration
interest in the agreement suggest that, if such opposition persists,
the prospect for Senate advice and consent to ratification any
time soon remains uncertain.1 60
Consequently, if ratification of the Moon Agreement proves
either undesirable or politically unachievable, the United States
could seek to establish a lunar resource regime wholly apart from
the Moon Agreement. As discussed, some precedent for this
approach exists in the U.S. rejection of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, 161  and subsequent conclusion of bilateral
agreements between the United States and several other
countries resolving overlapping claims regarding seabed-mining
areas) 62 The possibilities open to the United States in this respect
include the following:
0 The United States, as a party to the Outer Space Treaty,
could propose an amendment or protocol to that treaty
that would clearly protect and provide for the right of any
state or private enterprise to mine, acquire property rights
in, and exploit lunar or other outer space resources and
to retain a reasonable share of the profits.
authority "would discourage-if not outright prevent-the development of lunar
resources any time soon.").
Interestingly, in the recent science-fiction movie Moon, the lunar He-3 is exploited
by a private Japanese company that employs the protagonist engaged in the actual
mining activities. See MOON, supra note 3.
159. See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, Grand Plans for Moon and Mars, Budget Permitting,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at D2 ("The nascent private space industry, which has yet to
send anyone into orbit, does not seem likely to head to the Moon, either, with no
obvious profit windfall to offset the billions of dollars in cost. 'The idea that a private
investor can put together the funds to develop rockets capable of a lunar mission is
extremely speculative, verging on fantasy,' said John Logsdon, chairman of space history
at the National Air and Space Museum.").
160. See SCHMITr, RETURN TO THE MOON, supra note 3, at 286-87.
161. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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* The United States could propose to other "space powers"
and other interested countries the negotiation, on a
global basis, of an entirely new Moon Agreement
intended to replace the present agreement, and
containing different and more detailed provisions
reflecting U.S. preferences. The new agreement might
incorporate and be generally consistent with the tenor
and provisions of the Moon Agreement apart from its
provisions regarding the establishment of an acceptable
lunar resource regime. Such a negotiation could
conceivably occur either within COPUOS or outside the
U.N. framework.
0 The United States could take the same approach it
adopted under the 1980 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Act
with respect to the issue of deep seabed mining,163 and
negotiate a lunar resource agreement only with like-
minded states actually engaged in space activities and
showing a potential capacity to engage in lunar mining
activities, such as China, the European Union India,
Japan, and Russia. Such an agreement might not attempt
to deal with lunar activities as a whole, which are already
broadly covered in the Outer Space Treaty and in
provisions of the Moon Agreement that may arguably be
binding as customary law, 164 but could deal only with the
provision of rules relating more directly to the
exploitation of lunar resources.
o Finally, if objections are raised that it is premature to try
to agree now on a detailed lunar resource regime, since
the exploitation of such resources is unlikely for many
years, the United States might propose that the space
powers and other nations potentially involved in lunar
exploration and development, and possibly other
countries concerned, enter into at least a broad "lunar
resource principles" framework agreement, expressing a
firm commitment to the basic character of a regime which
would be acceptable to the United States.
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 523, supra note 116, n.5;
supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
164. See discussion supra notes 101-05.
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However, each of these possibilities has drawbacks. Each
bypasses and ignores the existing Moon Agreement and may, on
that basis alone, fail to win broad international support.
Moreover, the last three approaches may fail to provide the kind
of broader legal and political assurance that long-term state and
private investment in He-3-based fusion energy development is
likely to require.
3. Should the United States Seek to Establish an International
Organization or Enterprise for the Cooperative Development of
Lunar He-3 Mining and Perhaps, More Broadly, of Terrestrial
He-3-Based Fusion Energy?
The United States could take the initiative in seeking to
establish a user-based international organization or enterprise
designed to cooperatively develop and manage the mining and
distribution of lunar He-3 along with other lunar resources and,
perhaps more broadly, at least certain aspects of the
development, production, and distribution of He-3-based fusion
energy on Earth. 65 The organization could be comprised of, first,
the principal space powers and other nations willing to actively
participate in creating the necessary capabilities; second, other
nations and entities who are users or beneficiaries of such
capabilities; and, perhaps, third, private companies, consortia, or
investors interested and capable of investing and participation in
the enterprise as a whole. 166 The organization could be based on
a recognition that the Moon and its resources constitute a
common heritage of humankind, that the enormous potential of
He-3-based fusion energy deserves to be shared by all of the
Earth's nations and peoples, and that this promise might best be
165. For example, see the proposal by Harrison H. Schmitt and Christopher C.
Joyner for the establishment of INTERLUNE, a user-based international organization
whose primary purpose would be to manage the initial development of commercial
helium-3 fusion power on Earth and the development and operation of helium-3
production facilities on the Moon. See Christopher C. Joyner & Harrison H. Schmitt,
Lunar Bases and Extraterrestrial Law: General Gegal Principles and a Particular Regime
Proposal (1NTERLUNE), in LUNAR BASES AND SPACE ACTMTIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY,
supra note 40, at 741.
166. Id.; see also BILDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 88-89; Harrison H. Schmitt,
INTERLUNE Concept for Helium-3 Lunar Development 1-4 (1992), available at
http://icf4.neep.wisc.edu/pdf/wcsar9203-2.pdf. See generally SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE
MOON, supra note 3, at 149-53 (presenting various financial and managerial approaches
for mining the moon).
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achieved by a cooperative, rather than individualistic or
confrontational, approach to the development and management
of such a complex, challenging, costly, and potentially history-
changing source of energy. The world's leading technologically
advanced nations have already taken significant steps in this
direction in their cooperative approach to the development and
operation of the International Space Station 167 and the formation
of ITER. 168 The potential inclusion of private companies and
consortia in such an organization would recognize the growing
interest and the important and exciting possibilities of
participation by private enterprise in the commercial
development of spaceflight and space resources. 169
Such a cooperative international organization could take a
variety of forms. As several commentators have suggested, 170 it
might, for example, be modeled on the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization ("INTELSAT"), the
innovative user-based intergovernmental commercial consortium
which, pursuant to a U.S. initiative, was established by a number
of government and operating entities, initially on an interim
basis in 1964 and then by permanent agreement in 1973, to own
and manage a constellation of communications satellites
providing international broadcast services to all areas of the
167. See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also Cheryl Mansfield, A Station
Celebration, NASA, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.nasa.gov/mission-pages/station/
behindscenes/construction -begins.html (discussing the collaboration between various
nations to create the International Space Station).
168. See supra notes 22-24.
169. See, e.g., Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 3(1), 98 Stat.
3055, 3055 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 70101 (b) (1) (2006)) (stating as U.S. policy the desire
"to promote economic growth and entrepreneurial activity through the use of the space
environment for peaceful purposes"); see also 2003 Lunar Exploration Hearings, supra note
158 (testimony of Hon. Harrison H. Schmitt, Chairman, Interlune-Intermars Initiative,
Inc.); Hying High: America's Government Has No Money for Its Human-Spaceflight Plans. The
Private Sector Has Plenty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2009, at 87. See generally H.L. VAN TRAA-
ENGELMAN, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 277-313
(1993) (discussing private enterprise and space law). Notably, President Obama's
proposed 2011 budget for NASA calls for spending US$6 billion over five years to fund
the development of private commercial spacecraft that could ferry astronauts into low-
earth orbit. See Chang, supra note 2.
170. See, e.g., 1980 Senate Hearings, supra note 10, at 8, 15, 26, 173 (statements of
Roberts B. Owen, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, and statement of Eileen Galloway,
Director, Int'l Institute of Space Law of the Int'l Astronautical Federation); BILDER ET
AL., supra, note 3, at 89; PETERSON, supra note 10, at 164; SCHMITT, RETURN TO THE
MOON, supra note 3, at 289; Doyle, supra note 10, at 31-37; Galloway, Implementing the
Moon Agreement, supra note 10.
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world. 171 Membership in INTELSAT was open to any state that
was a member of the International Telecommunications Union
("ITU"), but access to the system was available to every nation. 172
Under the INTELSAT agreement, shares and votes in INTELSAT
were reallocated periodically in proportion to each member's
contribution to and use of the system. 173 That is, members that
contributed more investment through substantial use, such as the
United States, had more shares and voting weight in substantive
decisions of the organization. The organization's primary source
of revenue was from satellite usage fees, which, after deducting
operating costs, were redistributed to INTELSAT members in
proportion to their shares. 174 As indicated, satellite services were
available to any nation, whether or not a member of INTELSAT
and all users paid the same rates.17 5 This nondiscriminatory
pricing structure in effect subsidized lesser use by developing
countries with heavier use by more developed nations, thus
providing some sharing of the benefits of space communications
technology. INTELSAT was tied to the U.N. through its
recognition of the regulatory functions of the ITU.1 76
In 2001, INTELSAT, which by that time had over one-
hundred members, was privatized and renamed Intelsat, Ltd.177 It
is now the world's largest provider of satellite services, operating
171. See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization INTELSAT, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.ST. 3813, 1220 U.N.T.S. 22 [hereinafter
INTELSAT Treaty]; see also PETERSON, supra note 10, at 173-212; MILTON.L. SMITH,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 29-30 (1990); VAN TRAA-
ENGELMAN, supra note 169, at 112-33; Steven A. Levy, Intelsat: Technology, Politics and the
Transformation of a Regime, 29 INT'L ORG. 655, 658 (1975).
A similar organization, the International Maritime Satellite Organization
("INMARSAT") was established in 1979 to establish maritime satellite services, now
extended to land and air mobile communications and maritime communications. See
Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) art. 3,
Sept. 3, 1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, 1143 U.N.T.S. 105. In 1999, INMARSAT was also converted
into a private commercial company under United Kingdom law. See Daya Kishan Thussu,
Lost in Space, 121 FOREIGN POL'Y 70, 71 (2001); see also VAN TRAA-ENGELMAN, supra note
169, at 137-58 (discussing INMARSAT in detail).
172. See INTELSAT Treaty, supra note 171, pmbl.
173. See Operating Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization INTELSAT art. 6, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091, 1220 U.N.T.S.
149 [hereinafter INTELSAT Operating Agreement].
174. See id. art. 8(e).
175. See INTELSAT Treaty, supra note 171, pmbl.
176. See INTELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 173, art. 13, annex A(4).
177. See INTELSAT: 2000 and Beyond, http://www.intelsat.com/about-us/history/
intelsat-2000s.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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a fleet of over fifty communication satellites and providing service
to over 600 Earth stations in more than 149 countries and
territories. 7T INTELSAT offers not only a successful example of
international cooperation with respect to the profitable
commercial development of a common space resource but also
suggests the possibility of transitioning an initially
intergovernmental commercial consortium to participation or
management by private enterprise.
Whatever form such a cooperative international institutional
arrangement took, it would be designed and serve to provide
access and influence to all nations, participants, investors, and
customers in the development and use of He-3-based fusion
power, alleviate conflict and discontent over which nation or
nations should control lunar resources or resource-related
operations on the Moon, and assure that the benefits of He-3-
based fusion energy would be widely shared by all nations and
peoples. Among the more important objectives of such an
organization or enterprise would be: (1) raising the necessary
capital to sustain the development of a technologically and
economically viable He-3-based fusion energy system; (2)
developing the necessary fusion and lunar He-3 recovery
technology; (3) assuring effective and environmentally-sound
operation of terrestrial and lunar fusion-energy related facilities
and services; (4) assuring reliable supplies of He-3 and other
resources to terrestrial customers; (5) maintaining reasonable
and uniform rate structures to all users; (6) assuring access to
proprietary technologies, and resources and profits related to a
fair valuation of members' participation and contribution; and
(7) resolving disputes among members concerning their
participation in such an enterprise.
Such an organization or enterprise might conceivably be
established independent of any separate international agreement
regarding a lunar mining regime. Presumably, if this
organization embraced a sufficiently broad and significant
membership, including all of the leading space powers, it could
in itself constitute such a regime, although it would, of course,
have to conform to the broad principles set forth in the Outer
178. See INTELSAT: About Us, http://www.intelsat.com/about-us/ (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010); see also INTELSAT: Mission and Spacecraft Library,
http://msl/jpl.nasa.gov/Programs/intesat.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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Space Treaty and those provisions of the Moon Agreement which
can be considered to now reflect customary international law.179
Alternatively, such an organization or enterprise could be
designed to supplement and be compatible with the Moon
Agreement or other international agreement which might be
negotiated to deal with lunar resources. Indeed, article 16 of the
Moon Agreement specifically provides that an international
organization whose membership is comprised of a majority of
state parties may conduct activities under the agreement if it
accepts the agreement's obligations. 180  Finally, such an
organization or enterprise could be established under the Moon
Agreement by the parties to that agreement as, in itself, a part of
the "international regime, including appropriate procedures, to
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon"
that the parties undertake to establish under article 11 (5) and 18
of that agreement.' 8'
CONCLUSION
The need for affordable, safe, and non-polluting energy to
serve the Earth's growing population is increasingly evident and
urgent. The development of lunar He-3-based fusion energy,
while still uncertain of achievement, offers humanity a credible
prospect of meeting that need for centuries to come. Thus, it is
not surprising that the United States and other nations
proposing the eventual establishment of lunar bases have
expressed interest in the possible mining and exploitation of
lunar He-3.
However, neither nations nor private commercial
enterprises are likely to be willing to commit resources to an He-
3-based fusion energy program absent a stable and predictable
legal regime governing lunar resources that provides reasonable
assurance that any such effort and investment will be rewarded
and can be carried on without controversy or disruption. Yet, at
present, international space law fails to establish any detailed
rules governing the mining, ownership, and exploitation of He-3
and other lunar resources or to provide such assurance.
179. See discussion supra notes 101-05.
180. See supra text accompanying note 65.
181. Moon Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 11 (5), 18.
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Consequently, if the United States seriously contemplates the
possible development of He-3-based fusion energy, it is in its
national interest to take steps to establish what it would consider
as an acceptable and agreed-upon international lunar resource
regime-and to do so relatively soon.
There are a variety of ways, discussed above, in which the
United States could seek to establish such an acceptable
international lunar resource regime. Perhaps the simplest and
most promising would be approaches involving collective
accession by the United States and other major "space powers" to
the Moon Agreement under conditions or arrangements that
assure the incorporation of an acceptable lunar resource regime
within the Moon Agreement pursuant to articles 11 (5) and 18 of
that agreement. An additional initiative, well worth exploring, is
the possibility of the formation by the United States, other "space
powers," and other interested nations of a user-based
international organization or entity-open to all nations and
perhaps private enterprises-to undertake the collective
development and conduct of lunar He-3 and other resource
mining activities, as well as perhaps at least some aspects of the
development and management of terrestrial He-3-based fusion
energy itself. Such a collective enterprise might be established on
its own or perhaps incorporated within the framework of the
Moon Agreement under article 18 of that agreement.
However problematic and seemingly remote, the question of
the exploitation of He-3 and other lunar resources warrants the
U.S. government's-and international lawyers'-present
attention. While President Obama's recent proposal to eliminate
funding for NASA's Moon-bound Constellation program raises
doubts as to whether NASA will, at least in the immediate future,
implement the previous administration's program, 82 it seems
likely that the United States, and at least some other nations, will
eventually establish bases on the Moon-and perhaps on Mars or
other planets or their moons. Beginning now to think about and
craft collective solutions to the issues which may well arise from
such programs may not only facilitate such national activities but
avoid difficulties and disputes in the future. Moreover,
international cooperation in developing-and making available
182. See supra note 2.
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to all nations and people-a prospectively ideal and abundant
source of affordable, safe, and nonpolluting energy could usher
in a new and hopeful era for all humanity.
